Optimal Regulation of E-cigarettes: Theory and Evidence

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We model optimal e-cigarette regulation and estimate key parameters. Using tax changes and scanner data, we estimate relatively elastic demand. A demographic shift-share identification strategy suggests limited substitution between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. We field a new survey of public health experts who report that vaping is more harmful than previously believed. In our model’s average Monte Carlo simulation, these results imply optimal e-cigarette taxes are higher than recent norms. However, e-cigarette subsidies may be optimal if vaping is a stronger substitute for smoking and is safer than our experts report, or if consumers overestimate the health harms from vaping. (JEL D12, D18, D61, H21, H23, I12, I18)

As of 2019, eight million American adults and four million American youth reported using e-cigarettes, and many more youth now vape e-cigarettes than smoke traditional combustible cigarettes. There is significant disagreement about whether regulators should encourage or discourage this popular new product. Optimists point out that the widespread adoption suggests that e-cigarettes generate substantial consumer surplus. Furthermore, e-cigarettes can be a useful smoking cessation aid (Hajek et al. 2019), and vaping is less harmful than smoking cigarettes (National Academy of Sciences 2018). On the other hand, pessimists point out that widespread adoption of an addictive product is not necessarily good for well-being. Furthermore, vaping might be a gateway to smoking for youth, and the exact health effects of vaping are uncertain, as underscored by a recent spate of vaping-related illnesses and deaths (Gotts et al. 2019).

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This disagreement has played out in divergent and sometimes conflicting policies. In 2018, three-quarters of Americans lived in places with no e-cigarette taxes, while the states and local areas that do tax e-cigarettes impose very different rates. Many regulators think of e-cigarettes as a promising harm reduction tool for current smokers (Gottlieb 2018; Zeller 2019), but San Francisco has effectively banned all e-cigarette sales while keeping combustible cigarettes legal.

Is vaping in fact a substitute for smoking cigarettes, or a complement? Is this different for youth versus adults? What is the state of expert knowledge about the relative harms of vaping versus smoking? What is the socially optimal e-cigarette tax rate? Could it be optimal to ban all e-cigarette sales? How certain can we be about any policy prescriptions? This paper lays out a model of optimal e-cigarette regulation and derives equations for the optimal tax rate and the welfare effects of an e-cigarette ban. We then estimate key statistics using an array of empirical data and propose answers to the questions above.

Our theoretical model extends the optimal sin tax literature (Gruber and Köszegi 2001, 2004; Bernheim and Rangel 2004; O'Donoghue and Rabin 2006; Gul and Pesendorfer 2007; Allcott and Taubinsky 2015; Allcott, Lockwood, and Taubinsky 2019; Farhi and Gabaix 2020; and others) in a dynamic setting appropriate for studying addictive goods. We model heterogeneous consumers who consume a numéraire good plus two habit-forming goods (cigarettes and e-cigarettes) that impose internalities and externalities. By “internalities,” we mean that the social planner believes that consumers’ choices do not maximize their own long-run utility, perhaps because of present focus, projection bias or related misperceptions of addiction, or biased beliefs about health harms. The social planner can tax or ban either good.

In this framework, the optimal e-cigarette tax depends on three key parameters: the marginal uninternalized harms (externalities and internalities) from vaping, the marginal uninternalized harms from smoking, and the extent to which vaping and smoking are complements or substitutes. The welfare effect of banning e-cigarettes compared to keeping taxes at current levels depends on those same statistics plus the perceived consumer surplus loss as revealed by the e-cigarette demand curve. Optimally set taxes are always preferred to a ban in our model, but a ban may increase welfare relative to the status quo if tax rates are constrained by political issues, tax evasion, or other factors.

To estimate e-cigarette demand, we use Nielsen scanner data on e-cigarette sales at 27,000 stores across the country from 2013 to 2017. To identify the price elasticity, we exploit changes in state and local e-cigarette taxes. Before the tax changes, there is no trend in retail prices or quantities sold. After the tax changes, tax-inclusive retail prices rise persistently and sales drop. Our primary estimate suggests an own-price elasticity of about $-1.32$.

We also estimate the elasticity of substitution between e-cigarettes and cigarettes using tax changes for both goods. These estimates depend on the specification.

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1 For more discussion and evidence on internalities related to smoking and vaping, see Viscusi (1990, 2016, 2020); Gruber and Köszegi (2001, 2004); Gruber and Mullainathan (2005); Chaloupka et al. (2015); Ashley, Nardinelli, and Lavaty (2015); Cutler et al. (2015, 2016); Jin et al. (2015); DeCicca et al. (2017); Kenkel et al. (2019); Levy, Norton, and Smith (2018); Chaloupka, Levy, and White (2019); and DeCicca, Kenkel, and Lovenheim (2020).
Standard event study estimates suggest that e-cigarettes and cigarettes are substitutes, but there is graphical evidence of preexisting sales trends that would bias our estimates toward finding substitutability. When we add state-specific linear time controls that somewhat attenuate the preexisting trends, the substitution parameter shrinks substantially and becomes statistically insignificant. Furthermore, aggregate sales data cannot identify heterogeneous substitution parameters: vaping and smoking could be substitutes for adults and complements for youth.

We thus turn to a more novel strategy to identify substitution patterns, exploiting the fact that different demographic groups have very different demand for e-cigarettes. Specifically, White people, men, non-college graduates, lower-income people, and younger adults (but older youth) vape more than non-Whites, women, etc. Between 2004 and 2012, i.e., before e-cigarettes became popular, the demographic groups that would later have higher e-cigarette demand had steady linear declines in cigarette smoking relative to demographics with lower latent demand. If that relative decline accelerated after e-cigarettes became popular, this would suggest that vaping caused smoking to decrease, and thus that e-cigarettes are substitutes for combustible cigarettes. On the other hand, if that relative decline slowed, this would suggest that vaping caused more smoking.

This approach is a cousin of the “shift-share” identification strategy popularized by Bartik (1991): we interact cross-sectional variation in demand across demographics with the time-series growth in e-cigarette use. The identifying assumption is that any changes in relative smoking trends for high- versus low-vaping demographics were caused by the introduction of e-cigarettes. In support of this assumption, we find that smoking decreases were close to linear in the years before e-cigarettes were introduced and that the estimates are consistent across different demographics.

We implement this demographic shift-share strategy using data from five large nationally representative surveys comprising 7.4 million observations collected over the period 2004–2018: the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey, the National Health Interview Survey, the National Survey of Drug Use and Health, Monitoring the Future, and the National Youth Tobacco Survey. Our estimates are consistent with our earlier estimates identified from tax changes with geographic time trends: on average, vaping is not a significant complement or substitute for smoking. Our confidence intervals rule out that the introduction of e-cigarettes affected the 2004–2018 smoking decrease by more than 5 to 11 percent in either direction. To believe that e-cigarettes increased or decreased smoking by more than that, one would have to think that high-vaping demographics (young adults, White people, men, etc.) coincidentally all had unpredicted decreases or increases in cigarette demand over the past six years that exactly offset the alleged effects of their vaping.

There is great uncertainty about the health harms from vaping, and the research is evolving rapidly. To aggregate the state of knowledge about the harms from e-cigarettes, we surveyed public health experts who contributed to National Academy of Sciences or Surgeon General reports, have served on the FDA Tobacco Product Scientific Advisory Committee, have been honored as Fellows of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco, and/or edit one of three leading
tobacco research journals, as well as economists who have written on cigarettes or e-cigarettes. The average of the 137 experts who responded believes that vaping is 37 percent as harmful as smoking cigarettes, where harms are measured as effects on quality-adjusted life expectancy. There is substantial disagreement across experts: the interquartile range of beliefs about relative harms is 10 to 60 percent. Individual experts also perceive substantial uncertainty: the average expert reported a 90 percent confidence interval spanning 32 percentage points.

Seventy-eight percent of experts reported (and explicitly confirmed) that they are more pessimistic than prominent prior assessments that vaping is at least 95 percent safer than smoking cigarettes (Nutt et al. 2014; McNeill et al. 2018). When asked why they disagreed with prior work, experts gave three main explanations: they disagree with how researchers interpreted the evidence available at the time, new research evidence is becoming available, and e-cigarette products have changed.

Finally, we use our model to evaluate optimal e-cigarette regulation. The empirical results described above have clear implications for optimal policy. Relatively elastic demand implies relatively small perceived consumer surplus losses from an e-cigarette ban. Limited substitutability with combustible cigarettes means that optimal e-cigarette policy depends little on the uninternalized distortions from smoking. Larger health harms from vaping increase the optimal tax rate and increase the welfare gains from a ban.

In our primary estimates, we calibrate vaping externalities and internalities by multiplying experts’ beliefs about the relative health harms from vaping with prior estimates of smoking externalities and internalities. The optimal e-cigarette tax to address these distortions is positive in 91 percent of Monte Carlo simulations. The optimal e-cigarette tax exceeds $1.74 per milliliter of e-liquid (the norm in states and local areas that taxed e-cigarettes in 2018) in 47 percent of simulations, but due to a large right tail of possible uninternalized harms, the optimal tax in our average simulation is $3.73. The optimal tax is high enough that a complete ban would be preferred to the status quo in 44 percent of simulations.

We also consider two scenarios that can reverse the conclusion that e-cigarettes should be taxed. First, if vaping is only 5 percent as harmful as smoking (in contrast to what our experts report) and is a stronger substitute than what we find in the shift-share analysis (as suggested by our Nielsen estimates without linear time trends), then an e-liquid subsidy of $2.65 per milliliter is optimal in our model. Second, if consumers overestimate the health harms from vaping and information provision cannot correct these biased beliefs, then a very large e-cigarette subsidy is optimal.

There are several important caveats. First, our Nielsen scanner data cover only about 2.5 percent of e-cigarette retail, and our price elasticity estimate could be biased if this is an unrepresentative sample. Second, because we estimate e-cigarette demand off of relatively limited price variation, we must make strong functional form assumptions to estimate inframarginal demand and perceived consumer surplus; this is a standard problem when analyzing the welfare effects of bans or new products.

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2 Viscusi (2020) finds the average consumer believes that vaping is 65 percent as harmful as smoking cigarettes, which is more pessimistic than our average expert. Viscusi (2016); Elton-Marshall et al. (2020); McNeill et al. (2018) and others also present evidence that consumers overestimate vaping health risks.
(e.g., Hausman 1996; Petrin 2002). Third, our substitution estimates only capture a time horizon of a few years; we do not yet know if youth vapers will transition to combustible cigarettes later in life or if adult smokers need more time to substitute to e-cigarettes. Fourth, the key parameters may change in the future for any number of reasons, including the recent ban on flavored e-cigarettes.

Our work builds on a growing literature on e-cigarettes. Our primary contribution is to provide a framework for modeling optimal policy combined with new estimates of the key empirical parameters. We also provide an early estimate of the aggregate price elasticity of e-cigarette demand using tax variation and scanner data. Cotti et al. (2021) provide similar own-price elasticity estimates, and other papers study the effect of price changes in survey data or use scanner data to estimate different e-cigarette demand parameters.

Our estimates also advance the debate about whether vaping and smoking are complements or substitutes. A series of papers find that youth who vape are more likely to smoke in the future, even after controlling for observable characteristics that predict both vaping and smoking. Although it is possible that unobserved confounders could cause both smoking and vaping, some researchers have taken this as evidence that vaping causes future smoking, and thus that regulating vaping would improve public health. A series of other papers using quasi-experimental strategies have come to the opposite conclusion, finding that vaping and smoking are substitutes. However, there is some disagreement even between papers that use similar identification.

Our work speaks to four literatures outside of e-cigarettes. First, we extend the optimal sin tax literature mentioned above. Second, our demographic shift-share design is related to Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017), who identify the effects of the internet on political polarization by exploiting age differences in internet use.

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3 Kenkel et al. (2019) present survey data suggesting that behavioral biases reduce vaping and carry out simulations showing that such behavioral biases against vaping imply that taxing or banning e-cigarettes reduces welfare.

4 Pesko and Warman (2017); Pesko et al. (2018); Saffer et al. (2018); and Cantrell et al. (2019) estimate the association between price variation observed in Nielsen scanner data and survey measures of e-cigarette use. Pesko, Courtemanche, and Maclean (2020) estimate the effect of cigarette and e-cigarette tax changes on survey measures of e-cigarette use.

5 Zheng et al. (2017) and Huang et al. (2018) estimate the short-run residual demand elasticity faced by particular types of stores, using data at the city-month-store type level. Stoklosa, Drope, and Chaloupka (2016) estimate the short-run demand elasticity in the EU using country-by-month data. For our research question, the parameter of interest is the aggregate long-run demand elasticity. Short-run and long-run elasticities may differ due to stockpiling and habit formation, and the residual demand function faced by a set of stores could naturally differ from aggregate demand elasticity as consumers substitute across stores.

6 See Leventhal et al. (2015); Primack et al. (2015); Watkins, Glantz, and Chaffee (2018); Berry et al. (2019); and others, and see Chatterjee et al. (2016) and Soneji et al. (2017) for systematic reviews.

7 For example, an important review article by Soneji et al. (2017, 788) concludes that “e-cigarette use was associated with greater risk for subsequent cigarette smoking initiation and past 30-day cigarette smoking. Strong e-cigarette regulation could potentially curb use among youth and possibly limit the future population-level burden of cigarette smoking.” Similarly, an earlier review article by Chatterjee et al. (2016, 1) concludes that “[E]lectronic cigarettes are associated with higher incidence of combustible cigarette smoking. Policymakers need to recognize the insidious nature of this campaign by the tobacco industry and design policies to regulate it.” The National Academy of Sciences (2018, 555) study concludes, “the committee considered the overall body of evidence of a causal effect of e-cigarette use on risk of transition from never to ever smoking to be substantial.”

8 Friedman (2015); Pesko, Hughes, and Faisal (2016); Cooper and Pesko (2017); Pesko and Warman (2017); Saffer et al. (2018, 2019); Abouk et al. (2019); Cantrell et al. (2019); Dave, Feng, and Pesko (2019); Pesko and Currie (2019); Cotti et al. (2021); and Pesko, Courtemanche, and Maclean (2020) find that e-cigarettes and cigarettes are substitutes. Using similar identification (state-level tax variation and bans on e-cigarette sales to minors), however, Abouk and Adams (2017) and Cotti, Nesson, and Tefft (2018) find that they are complements.
adoption, and DeCicca et al. (2017), who identify the effects of menthol cigarettes by exploiting racial differences in tastes for menthol. Third, our work is broadly related to studies of the welfare effects of other new products (Trajtenberg 1989; Hausman 1996; Nevo 2003; Goolsbee and Petrin 2004; Gentzkow 2007; Aguiar and Waldfogel 2018; and others). Fourth, our expert survey helps to advance the literature using expert elicitations for scientific and public policy questions (DellaVigna and Pope 2018, 2019; Drupp et al. 2018; Pindyck 2019; DellaVigna, Otis, and Vivalt 2020).

Section I lays out the theoretical framework. Section II presents the data and recent trends. Sections III and IV present estimates of price elasticity and substitution patterns. Sections V and VI present the expert survey and optimal policy analysis, and Section VII concludes.

I. Theoretical Framework

We introduce a dynamic model of consumption of two addictive goods (cigarettes and e-cigarettes) with externalities and consumer bias. We then solve for optimal constant tax rates and the welfare effects of banning e-cigarettes compared to keeping taxes at some baseline level. Our model can be thought of as a reduced-form version of dynamic optimal sin tax models such as Gruber and K˝ oszegi (2001); Bernheim and Rangel (2004); and Gul and Pesendorfer (2007); or as a simple dynamic extension of static optimal sin tax models such as O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006); Allcott and Taubinsky (2015); and Farhi and Gabaix (2020).

A. Consumption, Bias, and Welfare

Setup.—There are infinite periods indexed by \( t \). There is a numéraire good \( n \) and two other goods indexed by \( j \) or \( k \): cigarettes \( c \) and e-cigarettes \( e \). All goods are produced at constant marginal cost in competitive markets. A social planner sets constant taxes \( \tau = \{ \tau^c, \tau^e \} \) and maintains a balanced budget in each period using a lump sum transfer \( T_t \). Let \( p = \{ p^c, p^e \} \) denote the vector of after-tax prices for \( c \) and \( e \); \( n \) is sold at price 1. While \( \tau \) and \( p \) might vary in the equations below, let \( \tilde{\tau} \) and \( \tilde{p} \) denote vectors of baseline taxes and market prices. We write \( j \) or \( k \) as superscripts to avoid confusion with other subscripts throughout the paper.

Heterogeneous consumers have finite types indexed by \( \theta \) with measure \( s_\theta \) and \( \sum_\theta s_\theta = 1 \). Let \( q_t = \{ q^c_t, q^e_t \} \) and \( q^n_t \) denote possible consumption levels in period \( t \), and let \( q_{\theta t} = \{ q^c_{\theta t}, q^e_{\theta t}, q^n_{\theta t} \} \) denote the actual consumption chosen by type \( \theta \). Type \( \theta \) consumers are endowed with income \( z_{\theta t} \) in period \( t \), giving post-transfer income \( z_{\theta t} + T_t \). For simplicity, there is no saving or borrowing across periods, so consumers have a period-specific budget constraint \( z_{\theta t} + T_t = p \cdot q_t + q^n_t \).

Consumers have quasi-linear flow utility in period \( t \) that depends on current consumption and a state variable \( S_t \) representing the consumption capital stock from past smoking and vaping. \( S_t \) evolves according to \( S_{t+1} = \Lambda (S_t, q_t) \), with \( \Lambda \) increasing in both arguments. Discounted utility from period 0 is

\[
U_\theta = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t \left[ u_\theta (q_t; S_t) + q^n_t \right],
\]
where $\delta < 1$ is the discount factor and $u_\theta$ is concave in $q_t$. In this general formulation, past consumption $S_t$ can affect both the level of utility (for example, by affecting health) and the marginal utility of consuming $c$ and $e$ (through habit formation). Furthermore, cigarettes and e-cigarettes can be complements or substitutes both in period $t$ and in the long run. For example, they may be substitutes in period $t$ sub-utility $u_\theta$ but complements in the long run through effects on $S_{t+1}$.

Optimizing Consumers.—Consider first a standard optimizing consumer. Let $V_\theta^*(S_t)$ be the optimizing consumer’s value function, after substituting in the period-specific budget constraint. $V_\theta^*(S_t)$ is the solution to the Bellman equation

$$
V_\theta^*(S_t) = \max_{q_t} \left[ u_\theta(q_t; S_t) - p_t \cdot q_t + z_\theta t + \delta V_\theta^*(S_{t+1}) \right],
$$

subject to $S_{t+1} = \Lambda(S_t, q_t)$.

The optimizing consumer’s first-order condition for good $j$ is

$$
0 = p^j - \left( \frac{\partial u_\theta(q^*_\theta; S_t)}{\partial q^j_t} + \delta \frac{\partial V_\theta^*(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \cdot \frac{\partial S_{t+1}}{\partial q^j_t} \right),
$$

where $q^*_\theta$ denotes optimal consumption for type $\theta$.

Non-Optimizing Consumers.—An important motivation for regulating both cigarettes and e-cigarettes is that consumers may not maximize their utility, perhaps because they have biased beliefs about the health costs of smoking, because they do not correctly predict future habit formation due to forces such as projection bias, or because they are present-biased. To model this, we allow consumers to choose $q_{\theta t}$ that differs from $q^*_\theta$ and thus may not maximize utility. These quantities could be derived by assuming that consumers maximize some specific “perceived” utility function such as quasi-hyperbolic utility, but we focus on insights that hold in general for any structural model of bias.\(^9\) Define $V_\theta(S_t) \leq V^*_\theta(S_t)$ as type $\theta$’s value function, i.e., the present discounted utility derived from (potentially suboptimal) actual consumption. Substituting in the budget constraint, we can write utility from time $t$ as

$$
U_\theta(q_t; S_t) = u_\theta(q_t; S_t) - p_t \cdot q_t + z_\theta t + \delta V_\theta(S_{t+1}),
$$

subject to $S_{t+1} = \Lambda(S_t, q_t)$. Standard optimizing consumers maximize this equation, making it equivalent to equation (2), but non-optimizing consumers do not.

Following the sin tax literature, we then define bias $\gamma_\theta(p, S_t)$ as the difference (in units of dollars) between price and the marginal utility of good $j$ at the chosen consumption levels $q_{\theta t}$:

$$
\gamma_\theta(p, S_t) := p^j - \left( \frac{\partial u_\theta(q^*_\theta; S_t)}{\partial q^j_t} + \delta \frac{\partial V_\theta(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \cdot \frac{\partial S_{t+1}}{\partial q^j_t} \right).
$$

\(^9\) See Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Congdon (2012); Chetty (2015); and Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018) for further discussion of the “reduced form” or “sufficient statistic” approach to behavioral public economics.
Put differently, $\gamma^i_\theta$ is the period $t$ price increase that would induce consumers of type $\theta$ to consume $q^i_{\theta t}$. $\gamma^i_\theta > 0$ means that type $\theta$ consumes more than the privately optimal amount, $\gamma^i_\theta < 0$ means that type $\theta$ consumes less, and $\gamma^i_\theta = 0$ when $q^i_{\theta t} = q^i_{\theta t}$, per equation (3). $\gamma^i_\theta(p,S_t)$ depends on prices and consumption in other periods, as these factors affect flow utility and the continuation value function.

To illustrate, consider two examples. First, consider present-biased consumers whose smoking and vaping imposes future health harms, in a model with no habit formation. Specifically, assume that $u_\theta(q,S_t) = v(q_t) - h S_t$, where the second term is the health harm from past consumption, which evolves according to $S_{t+1} = \rho(S_t + q_t^\gamma + q_t^\gamma)$ for $\rho \in (0,1)$. Considering the infinite discounted sum of future health harms $h S_t$, the effect of consumption on the continuation value is $\frac{\partial V_\theta(S_{t+1})}{\partial q^\gamma_{t+1}} \cdot \frac{\partial S_{t+1}}{\partial q^\gamma_{t+1}} = -\frac{\rho}{1 - \delta \rho} h$, so the marginal utility of consumption at $q^\gamma_{\theta t}$ is $\frac{\partial v(q)_{\theta t}}{\partial q^\gamma_{t}} - \frac{\delta \rho}{1 - \delta \rho} h$. Quasi-hyperbolic consumers discount future harms by $\beta_\theta$, choosing consumption to set $p^j_t = \frac{\partial v(q)_{\theta t}}{\partial q^\gamma_{t}} - \beta_\theta \frac{\delta \rho}{1 - \delta \rho} h$. Substituting marginal utility and the consumption choice into the definition of $\gamma^j_\theta$ from equation (5) gives

$$
(6) \quad \gamma^j_\theta = (1 - \beta_\theta) \frac{\delta \rho}{1 - \delta \rho} h.
$$

This is the familiar result that bias (from the long-run self’s perspective) is the uninternalized future health cost.

As a second example, imagine that projection bias causes consumers to underestimate habit formation. Specifically, define $\alpha^j_t := \frac{\partial S_{t+1}}{\partial q^\gamma_{t}}$ as the habit formation from good $j$, and allow consumers to misperceive habit formation as $\hat{\alpha}^j_\theta$. Assume for simplicity that the marginal effect of habit stock on future utility $\frac{\partial V_\theta(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}}$ is a constant.

The marginal utility of consumption is $\left(\frac{\partial u_\theta(q^\gamma_{\theta t}; S_t)}{\partial q^\gamma_{t}} + \delta \frac{\partial V_\theta(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \cdot \alpha^j_t\right)$, but consumers choose consumption to set $p^j_t = \left(\frac{\partial u_\theta(q^\gamma_{\theta t}; S_t)}{\partial q^\gamma_{t}} + \delta \frac{\partial V_\theta(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \cdot \hat{\alpha}^j_\theta\right)$, so

$$
(7) \quad \gamma^j_\theta = \delta \frac{\partial V(S_{t+1})}{\partial S_{t+1}} \cdot (\hat{\alpha}^j_\theta - \alpha^j_t).
$$

*Externalities and Social Welfare.*—Consumers impose linear negative externalities $\phi_\theta = \{\phi^c_\theta, \phi^s_\theta\}$ on the government budget, for example due to increased costs of government-sponsored health care or reduced social security payments due to early death. The results would be the same if some or all of the externality entered other consumers’ utility directly, for example due to second-hand smoke. For simplicity, we assume that the externality is imposed in the period when consumption occurs.

Social welfare from period 0 as a function of taxes $\tau$ is

$$
(8) \quad W(\tau) = \sum_\theta s_\theta U_\theta.
$$
and the government’s balanced budget constraint requires
\[ T_t = \sum_\theta (\tau - \phi_\theta) \cdot q_{\theta t} \]
for all \( t \).

### B. Optimal Taxes

Define the “marginal distortion” \( \varphi'_\theta \) as the sum of the marginal bias and marginal externality for consumer type \( \theta \):

\[ \varphi'_\theta(p, S_t) := \gamma'_\theta(p, S_t) + \phi'_\theta. \]

\( \varphi'_\theta(p, S_t) \) will be a key statistic determining welfare and the optimal tax. This highlights that externalities and internalities enter our model in the same way: they both reflect a difference (in units of dollars) between consumers’ perceived marginal utility (revealed by the demand curve) and marginal social welfare.

Online Appendix Section A.1 derives optimal taxes by maximizing equation (8) subject to the balanced budget constraint and consumer decision-making.

**PROPOSITION 1:** The optimal taxes satisfy

\[ \tau^*_j = \frac{\sum_{\theta,t} \delta^t s_\theta \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j} \varphi'_\theta(p, S_t)}{\sum_{\theta,t} \delta^t s_\theta \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j}} + \frac{\sum_{\theta,t} \delta^t s_\theta \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j} (\varphi^{-j}_{\theta}(p, S_t) - \tau^{-j}_t)}{\sum_{\theta,t} \delta^t s_\theta \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j}}. \]

The first term is the average marginal distortion, familiar from Diamond (1973): the average distortion across types, weighted by each type’s own-price response. The optimal tax is larger if the average distortion is larger or if distortions are larger for types who are more responsive to the tax. The second term is a substitution distortion: the average uninternalized distortion from the substitute good, weighted by each type’s cross-price response. The optimal tax is larger if a substitute good has a beneficial uninternalized distortion or if a complementary good has a harmful uninternalized distortion.

The demand response \( \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j} \) is a total derivative, reflecting changes in period \( t \) consumption caused by changes in prices in all periods, including the effects of habit formation. Both \( \frac{dq^t_{\theta t}}{dp^j} \) and the marginal distortion \( \varphi'_\theta(p, S_t) \) can vary over time and are affected by changes in tax-inclusive prices and consumption capital stock.

This simple extension of standard formulas has interesting implications in our application. First, the optimal cigarette tax may have changed with the introduction of e-cigarettes. For example, vaping is particularly popular among youth, and youth may have higher marginal internalities and externalities. If there are now fewer youth smokers marginal to the cigarette tax, this would decrease the average marginal distortion and thus decrease the optimal cigarette tax. As another example, many states have not yet implemented e-cigarette taxes because vaping is so new. If the
average e-cigarette tax is lower than the average marginal distortion and e-cigarettes are substitutes (or complements) for cigarettes, then the substitution distortion from e-cigarettes is negative (positive) and the optimal cigarette tax would decrease (increase). As a final example, e-cigarettes could reduce the health harms from cigarette addiction if addicted cigarette smokers can transition to vaping. With present focus or projection bias, this reduction in the harms from addiction could imply lower bias \( \varphi^e(p, S_t) \) and thus a lower optimal cigarette tax.

A second, related, implication is that even if the cigarette tax is set optimally, the optimal e-cigarette tax can depend on substitution from cigarettes, and vice versa. With homogeneous e-cigarette and cigarette distortions, the optimal taxes for each will be exactly equal to the average marginal distortion and substitution plays no role. However, if either distortion varies by type and the products are substitutes or complements, then both taxes must account for the residual uninternalized distortions that are not offset by the tax.

A third implication is that the optimal e-cigarette tax could plausibly be negative, i.e., a subsidy, if the substitution distortion from cigarettes is relatively large and negative. This could arise if e-cigarettes are not very harmful (\( \varphi^e \) is small or negative), baseline cigarette taxes are “too low” (\( \varphi^c - \tilde{\tau}^c > 0 \)), and e-cigarettes are substitutes for cigarettes (\( \frac{dq^e_{\theta t}}{dp^e} > 0 \)).

### C. Welfare Effect of an E-cigarette Ban

We model an e-cigarette ban as an increase in the e-cigarette tax from current level \( \tilde{\tau}^e \) to \( \infty \) for all periods beginning with period 0. The welfare effect of a ban is thus

\[
\Delta W := \int_{\tilde{\tau}^e}^{\infty} \frac{\partial W(\tau)}{\partial \tau^e} d\tau^e.
\]

(11)

If the cigarette and e-cigarette taxes are currently set optimally, then raising \( \tau^e \) to \( \infty \) by construction reduces welfare in our model. However, a ban may be preferred to taxation for unmodeled reasons such as tax evasion or political constraints on tax rates. We thus allow status quo taxes \( \hat{\tau} \) to take any value, not necessarily the optimal rates. Furthermore, bias and externalities (and thus optimal tax rates) may vary across types (e.g., youth versus adults), and it may be administratively easier to implement a type-specific ban (e.g., a ban on sales to youth) than to implement type-specific taxes.

Define \( \Delta q^e_{\theta t} := q^e_{\theta t}(\tilde{\tau}^e, \tau^e = \infty) - q^e_{\theta t}(\hat{\tau}) \) as the change in period \( t \) consumption of good \( j \) from a permanent e-cigarette ban. For e-cigarettes, this is simply period \( t \) consumption: \( \Delta q^e_{\theta t} = -q^e_{\theta t}(\hat{p}) < 0 \). Further define

\[
\varphi^e(\mathbf{p}, S_t) := \frac{\int_{\tilde{\tau}^e}^{\infty} \frac{\partial W(\tau)}{\partial \tau^e} d\tau^e}{\Delta q^e_{\theta t}}.
\]

(12)
This is the average distortion over the consumption of good \( j \) that is marginal to the e-cigarette ban. Online Appendix Section A.1 shows that substituting these into the integral from equation (11) gives the welfare effect of a ban.

**PROPOSITION 2:** The welfare effect of a ban relative to status quo taxes \( \tilde{\tau} \) is

\[
\Delta W = \sum_{\theta,t} \delta^t s_{\theta} \left[ -\int_{\tau_j}^{\infty} q_{\theta,t}^j d\tau^j - \sum_j \Delta q_{\theta,t}^j \left( \varphi_{\theta,t}(p,S_t) - \tilde{\tau}_t \right) \right].
\]

The first term in equation (13) is the loss in perceived consumer surplus as traced out by the market demand curve. The second term captures the change in uninternalized negative distortions from both cigarettes and e-cigarettes. Separating the two terms in this way foreshadows that one can calculate \( \Delta W \) by estimating perceived consumer surplus with standard demand estimation techniques and then separately quantifying the internalities and externalities in \( \varphi_{\theta,t} \).

If \( \Delta q_{\theta,t}^c(\varphi_{\theta,t} - \tilde{\tau}_t) = 0 \), which holds if e-cigarettes and cigarettes are neither complements nor substitutes or if the status quo cigarette tax exactly internalizes the average distortion marginal to the ban, then the e-cigarette market can be considered in isolation. Otherwise, an e-cigarette ban affects uninternalized distortions in the cigarette market. In theory, the reduced uninternalized distortions from cigarettes could justify an e-cigarette ban even if e-cigarettes have no uninternalized distortions.

**D. Empirical Implementation**

Online Appendix Section A.2 shows that equations (10) and (13) can be simplified for empirical implementation under additional assumptions. We define \( \eta_j^t := \frac{dq_{\theta,t}^c/dp^c}{q_{\theta,t}^c/p^c} \) as the own-price elasticity and \( \sigma_{\theta,t}^j := \frac{dq_{\theta,t}^c/dp^c}{dq_{\theta,t}^c/dp^c} \) as a substitution parameter representing the ratio of demand responses to a permanent price change. We further define \( \varphi_{\theta} := \mathbb{E}_t[\varphi_{\theta}(p,S_t) | \theta] \), \( \sigma_{\theta} := \mathbb{E}_t[\sigma_{\theta,t} | \theta] \), and \( q_{\theta} := \mathbb{E}_t[q_{\theta,t} | \theta] \) as expectations over time. \( \sigma_{\theta} \) captures the net long-run substitutability between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. When we use \( \eta \) and \( \sigma \) without superscripts in the rest of the paper, we are referring to the e-cigarette parameters (\( j = e \)).

To empirically quantify the optimal tax, we impose two assumptions. First, we assume that the price elasticity \( \eta_j^t \) is homogeneous and time-invariant, because the Nielsen RMS data do not allow us to separately estimate elasticities by consumer type. Second, we assume pairwise zero covariance between the marginal distortion \( \varphi_{\theta}(p,S_t) \), substitution \( \sigma_{\theta,t}^j \), consumption \( q_{\theta,t}^e \), and time \( t \) for each type. While this assumes away potentially interesting dynamics, we are not able to credibly estimate how any of these parameters covary or would change over time in response to a tax or ban.

**ASSUMPTION 1:** \( \eta_{\theta,t} = \eta_j^t \), for all \((\theta,t)\).
ASSUMPTION 2: \( \phi_b(p, S_t), \sigma_{\theta_t}, q_{\theta_t}, \) and \( t \) have pairwise zero covariance conditional on \( \theta \).

COROLLARY 1: Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal taxes satisfy

\[
\tau_j^* = \sum_{\theta} s_\theta q_{\theta j} \left[ \phi_{\theta j} + \sigma_{\theta} (\phi_{\theta j} - \tau_j - \tau) \right] \div \sum_{\theta} s_\theta q_{\theta j}.
\]

To empirically quantify the welfare effect of an e-cigarette ban, we write the expected cigarette consumption change as \( \Delta q_{\theta c} = -\sigma_{\theta} q_{\theta e} (\bar{p}) \). To estimate perceived consumer surplus change, some assumption is required because observed market prices do not rise high enough to identify the demand function at high prices. We assume that each type’s perceived consumer surplus change equals the area under a linear demand curve drawn tangent to their demand function at current prices, which is the triangle \( \Delta q_{\theta e} \frac{\bar{p}_e}{-2\eta} < 0 \).

ASSUMPTION 3: \(-\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} q_{\theta e} dr = \Delta q_{\theta e} \frac{\bar{p}_e}{-2\eta} \).

COROLLARY 2: Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the welfare effect of an e-cigarette ban relative to status quo taxes \( \bar{\tau} \) in the average period is

\[
\Delta \bar{W} = \sum_{\theta} s_\theta \left[ \frac{\Delta q_{\theta e} \bar{p}_e}{-2\eta} - \sum_j \Delta q_{\theta j} (\phi_{\theta j} - \bar{\tau}_j) \right].
\]

In the rest of the paper, we estimate \( \tau^{ext} \) and \( \Delta \bar{W} \) using these formulas.

II. Data

A. Nielsen Scanner Data

For our price elasticity estimates in Section III, we use scanner data from Nielsen’s Retail Measurement Services (RMS) for 2013–2017 (NielsenIQ 2014–2018). The data include weekly prices and sales volumes by UPC at approximately 27,000 stores in the contiguous US from 96 retail chains. See online Appendix Section B for RMS data construction details.

RMS includes 53, 32, 55, and 2 percent of total sales in the grocery, mass merchandiser, drug, and convenience store channels, respectively. In addition to its very limited coverage of convenience stores, RMS has no coverage of vape shops or online channels where many e-cigarette products are sold. In 2017, RMS stores sold $114 million in e-cigarette products, out of the $4.6 billion sold nationwide as shown in Figure 1. This 2.5 percent coverage rate is an important limitation of the data.\(^{10}\)

\(^{10}\)Although the household-level Nielsen Homescan data could also be useful in exploring heterogeneity and measuring additional purchases outside of RMS stores, Homescan’s effective sample size is much smaller. Homescan, with 60,000 households, covers about 0.05 percent of the United States, against the 2.5 percent in RMS.
We collected data on the volume of each UPC (in milliliters of e-liquid) from online databases, manufacturer websites, store visits, and from a database kindly shared by the authors of Cotti et al. (2021).

As shown in online Appendix Table A1, 11 states, counties, or cities in the contiguous US initiated or changed e-cigarette taxes between 2013 and 2017. We use these tax changes for identification. For our empirical analysis, we define 51 geographic “clusters”: the two counties (Montgomery County, MD, and Cook County, IL) that have county-level e-cigarette taxes, the contiguous 48 states (where Maryland and Illinois exclude Montgomery County and Cook County), and Washington, DC. We collapse the UPC-store-week RMS data to the level of UPC-cluster-month, calculating total units sold and quantity-weighted average price.

B. Smoking and Vaping Sample Surveys

For our substitution estimates in Section IV, we use all major annual surveys that have recorded information on vaping and/or smoking for adults (people aged 18 or older) and/or youth (people in grades 6–12) in the US since 2004: the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005–2019a), the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005–2019b), the National Survey of Drug Use and Health (NSDUH; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration 2005–2019), Monitoring the Future (MTF; University of Michigan 2005–2019), and the National Youth Tobacco Survey (NYTS; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2005–2019c). We have 7.4 million observations across the five datasets in total, or about 500,000 per year, more than two-thirds of which are from BRFSS; see online Appendix Table A2. All estimates in the paper are weighted for national representativeness.

Online Appendix Section B details how we construct consistent smoking and vaping variables. We construct smoking in units of packs of cigarettes smoked per day and vaping in units of share of days vaped. In all datasets other than BRFSS, we can directly estimate the number of packs per day smoked. BRFSS only consistently records whether someone smokes or vapes “every day,” “some days,” or “not at all,” but we use conditional means from the other adult datasets to impute packs per day smoked and share of days vaped. The datasets do not include the quantity of e-liquid used or the nicotine content of cigarettes or e-liquid.

Demographic variables are central to our analysis. From the possible set of standard demographics (age, race/ethnicity, etc.), we include a demographic variable only if it is observed consistently across all datasets. We denote the vector of demographic group indicators for person $i$ as $G_i$. For adults, $G_i$ includes race/ethnicity (Asian, Black, other/missing, Hispanic, White), sex (male/female), educational attainment (high school, less than high school, some college, college graduate), income quintiles, and age groups (18–24, 25–29, 30–49, 50–64, and 65+). For youth, $G_i$ includes race (Black, other/missing, Hispanic, White), sex, and each

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11 The city of Chicago also has an e-cigarette tax; we add this to the Cook County tax because the RMS store data include identifiers for county but not city.
grade from 6–12. We refer to demographic “cells” as the interactions of our demographic group indicators, e.g., “Asian women aged 18–24 who are college graduates and are in the lowest-income quintile.” There are $5 \times 2 \times 4 \times 5 \times 5 = 1,000$ cells for adults and $4 \times 2 \times 7 = 56$ cells for youth.

We are limited to four race/ethnicity groups in the youth dataset because Asian is not a separate category from other race in the public-use MTF.

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**Figure 1. National E-cigarette and Cigarette Sales over Time**

*Note: Data are from Euromonitor International (2005–2020, 2009–2020).*
In our regressions described below, we include “dataset controls” to address two sampling issues. First, in 2011, BRFSS was updated to sample people using cell phones instead of only people with land lines (Pierannunzi et al. 2012). This causes an artificial change in smoking rates, and this change could differ across demographic groups. Second, the NYTS is collected in 2004, 2006, 2009, and annually since 2011, but not in 2005, 2007, 2008, or 2010.

C. E-cigarette User Survey

To estimate the average e-liquid price and quantity consumed per day, we ran a survey we call the E-cigarette User Survey in August 2019 (Allcott and Rafkin 2022). The sample is an online panel of US e-cigarette users provided by polling firm SurveyMonkey through their Audience Panel service. We asked whether people now use e-cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all, the number of days vaped out of the past 30, the milliliters of e-liquid consumed in the past 30 days, and the amount of money they spent to buy the e-liquid consumed in the past 30 days. We have 123 valid responses to the questions about e-cigarette volume and prices, which are the main questions we use in the analysis. We weight the sample to be representative of US adults who vaped in the past 30 days on income, gender, and vaping frequency.

We estimate that the average e-liquid price is $\tilde{p}_e \approx 3.89 per milliliter (ml). For comparison, the popular 0.7 milliliter Juul pods cost $6.41/ml at average tax rates, while large 100 ml e-liquid bottles can be as cheap as $0.50/ml. The average day of vaping involves $\Gamma \approx 0.58$ milliliters of e-liquid consumption, slightly less than 1 Juul pod. This is more than the unweighted average across vapers of consumption per day, because people who vape every day consume more e-liquid per day than people who vape on some days.

D. Smoking and Vaping Trends

Figure 1 presents trends in US sales of cigarettes and e-cigarettes. Cigarette sales decreased by 40 percent (from 20 billion to 12 billion packs) from 2004 to 2018. While the first modern e-cigarettes became available in the late 2000s, sales were relatively low until about 2013. Sales grew continually from 2013 to 2017 and increased notably in 2018 with the Juul e-cigarette’s rise in popularity.

Figure 2 presents trends in smoking and vaping recorded in the sample surveys. Self-reported adult smoking in panel A declined by about 45 percent (from about 0.15 to 0.08 packs per adult per day) from 2004 to 2018. The 2011 jump in the BRFSS trend is due to the sampling frame change discussed earlier. Youth smoking in panel B dropped by an even larger proportion, from about 0.035 to less than 0.01 packs per youth per day. In online Appendix Section B.2.8, we calculate that the sample survey data overstate e-cigarette sales and understate cigarette sales by an amount consistent with earlier estimates by Liber and Warner (2018).

13 The survey instrument can be accessed from https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/YRZSZZY.
On the cigarette consumption figures, we add a vertical line to mark the time just before e-cigarette sales started to take off in 2013. The smoking declines in Figures 1 and 2 are close to linear, with no substantial changes as e-cigarettes became popular after 2013. Unless there was some countervailing force that would have changed cigarette consumption trends at the same time that vaping became popular, this suggests that vaping is not a strong complement or substitute for smoking (Levy et al.

FIGURE 2. SMOKING AND VAPING TRENDS

Notes: This figure presents combustible cigarette and e-cigarette use by survey and year. The BRFSS sampling frame changes in 2011, causing a jump in reported cigarette use. The NSDUH does not record data on vaping.
Online Appendix Section C quantifies this argument for both cigarette smoking and youth marijuana use, and we extend this intuition to develop our estimation strategy in Section IV.

III. Price Elasticity

A. Empirical Strategy

In this section, we use tax changes to estimate the own price elasticity $\eta$ and the substitution parameter $\sigma_{\theta}$ using Nielsen RMS data. We index UPCs by $k$, geographic clusters by $s$, and months by $t$. Let $q^{e}_{kst}$, $\hat{p}^{e}_{kst}$, and $\hat{\tau}^{e}_{kst}$ denote quantity sold, sales-weighted average tax-inclusive price, and the ad valorem tax rate, respectively, for e-cigarette UPCs. Let $\hat{p}^{c}_{st}$ and $\hat{\tau}^{c}_{st}$ denote the sales-weighted average tax inclusive price and average tax rate as a percentage of tax-exclusive price, respectively, for cigarettes in a given state and month.\footnote{Some e-cigarette taxes are “specific” taxes per milliliter of e-liquid, and all cigarette taxes are specific taxes per pack. We transform these tax rates to the implied ad valorem rate using the UPC’s size and price. See online Appendix Section B for details.} Let $X_{st}$ denote a cluster-specific linear time trend and an additional vector of controls for potential confounders that might be correlated with both taxes and consumption: the state unemployment rate (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021b) and beer tax rate (Alcohol Policy Information System 2020a, b) as well as indicators for whether the state has an indoor vaping ban (American Nonsmokers’ Rights Foundation 2021), has a medical marijuana law (Marijuana Policy Project 2020), passed a prescription drug program (Prescription Drug Monitoring Program 2021), implemented a prescription drug program (Prescription Drug Monitoring Program 2021), and implemented the Medicaid expansion (Kaiser Family Foundation 2020).

Let $E_{0st}$ be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if month $t$ is 0–2 months after an e-cigarette tax change in cluster $s$, and define the vector $Q_{kst} = \left[ E_{0st}, E_{0st}\ln(\hat{\tau}^{e}_{kst} + 1) \right]$. The event study figure presented below suggests that prices and sales are slow to adjust in the first quarter after a tax change; controlling for $Q_{kst}$ identifies the elasticity $\eta$ beginning in the second quarter. Finally, let $\nu_{kt}$, $\mu_{ks}$, and $\xi_{d(s)t}$, respectively denote UPC-month, UPC-cluster, and census division-month fixed effects.

Our estimating equation is

$$\ln(q^{e}_{kst}) = \eta\ln(\hat{p}^{e}_{kst}) + \chi^{e}\ln(\hat{p}^{e}_{st}) + \beta X_{st} + \kappa Q_{kst} + \nu_{kt} + \mu_{ks} + \xi_{d(s)t} + \varepsilon_{kst},$$

where we instrument for $\ln(\hat{p}^{e}_{kst})$ and $\ln(\hat{p}^{e}_{st})$ with $\ln(\hat{\tau}^{e}_{kst} + 1)$ and $\ln(\hat{\tau}^{c}_{st} + 1)$. The coefficient $\eta$ is our estimate of the own-price elasticity of demand for e-cigarettes. The coefficient $\chi^{e}$ is the elasticity of substitution, which we transform into $\sigma_{\theta}$ below. We weight each UPC-cluster-month observation by the UPC’s sales in nontaxed clusters in that calendar year, normalized by total sales across all UPCs in nontaxed clusters in that year. We cluster standard errors by geographic cluster.
We also present event study figures to test for any trends before tax changes and examine how the tax effects vary over time. In four geographic clusters, e-cigarette tax rates change more than once during the sample period. We index tax change events within a cluster by \( v \in \{1, 2, 3\} \), and we define \( V_s \) as the set of changes within cluster \( s \). We define \( \Delta \ln (\tilde{\tau}_{ksv} + 1) \) as the change in the log e-cigarette tax variable that occurs for UPC \( k \) in cluster \( s \) in event \( v \). Let \( E_{qst} \) represent an indicator variable that takes value 1 if month \( t \) is \( q \) quarters after an e-cigarette tax change in cluster \( s \), with \( E_{0st} \) as defined above.\(^{15} \) We then estimate a multiple event study specification (Sandler and Sandler 2014):

\[
(17) \quad y_{kst} = \sum_{v \in V_s} \sum_{q \in Q} \eta_{q} E_{qst} \Delta \ln (\tilde{\tau}_{ksv} + 1) + \chi^e \ln (\tilde{\tau}_{st}^e + 1) + \beta X_{st} + \nu_{kt} + \mu_{ks} + \xi_{d(s)t} + \varepsilon_{kst},
\]

for \( y_{kst} \in \{ \ln (q_{kst}), \ln (\tilde{p}_{kst}) \} \). Since we have \( \mu_{ks} \) fixed effects and \( \Delta \ln (\tilde{\tau}_{ksv} + 1) \) is constant within \( ks \) for each tax change event, we let \( Q \) be a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of event time indicators excluding \(-1\) (the quarter before the tax change) to avoid collinearity.

This empirical strategy has several limitations. First, as we have discussed, RMS covers only 2.5 percent of national e-cigarette sales. The demand elasticity estimated in RMS might differ from the true nationwide demand elasticity if RMS stores serve a non-representative set of e-cigarette consumers or if consumers substitute toward or away from RMS stores in response to a tax. For example, consumers might substitute purchases to retailers in other states or to illegal retailers that evade taxes. Second, while we observe sales for up to several years after a tax change, our estimates may still not reflect the full long-run price elasticity if habit formation takes longer to manifest. Third, we must assume that no other factors affected e-cigarette demand at the same time as the tax changes. Rees-Jones and Rozema (2020) show that local media coverage of cigarettes increases as cigarette taxes are debated and implemented, and such forces could also change e-cigarette demand as e-cigarette taxes are implemented.

B. Event Study Figures

Panels A and B of Figure 3 present estimates of equation (17) with \( \ln (\tilde{p}_{kst}) \) and \( \ln (q_{kst}) \) as the dependent variables. Panel A shows that we have a strong first stage: in the six quarters after a tax change, retail prices rise by 0.5–0.8 log points. Panel B presents the reduced form: in the six quarters after a tax change, quantities decline by 0.7–1.5 log points. There is no trend in either prices or quantities in the six quarters before the tax change. Online Appendix Figure A3 shows that we get very similar point estimates and more precise standard errors when we exclude the cluster-specific linear time trends.

\(^{15} \)Specifically, \( E_{1st} = 1 \) if month \( t \) is 3–5 months after a tax change, \( E_{2st} = -1 \) if month \( t \) is 1–3 months before a tax change, etc.
C. Parameter Estimates

Table 1 presents estimates of equation (16). Panel A presents the first stages and reduced form. Columns 1 and 2 show that a tax on one good strongly predicts that...
good’s price while having a much more limited relationship to the other good’s price. Column 3 shows that e-cigarette taxes reduce e-cigarette demand, while cigarette taxes have a positive but insignificant coefficient.

Panel B presents the instrumental variables estimates of $\eta$ and $\chi$. Our estimate in column 1 suggests that e-cigarette demand is more than unit elastic, with $\hat{\eta} \approx -1.32$. Columns 2–6 progressively add fixed effects, cluster-specific linear time trends, and the additional controls in $X_{st}$. Column 7 presents estimates in a “quasi-panel” where we change the dependent variable to $\ln(q_{kst} + 1)$ and include all observations (now including $q_{kst} = 0$) after any sales are observed in a UPC-cluster; we impute price $\hat{p}_{kst}$ from the last month a sale was observed in that cluster. The $\hat{\eta}$ estimates change somewhat across columns 1–7 but are broadly similar.

Columns 1 and 5 show that the substitution elasticity estimates are $\hat{\chi} \approx 0.22$ and $\hat{\chi} \approx 0.84$, respectively, with and without the cluster-specific linear time trends. Online Appendix Table A3 presents symmetric estimates of cigarette demand.

### Table 1—Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand for E-cigarettes

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<th>$\ln(\text{cig price})$</th>
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<th>$\ln(\text{cig units})$</th>
<th>$\ln(\text{e-cig units})$</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: This table presents estimates of the own- and cross-price elasticity of demand for e-cigarettes from equation (16), using UPC-cluster-month data. There are 51 geographic clusters: the two counties that have e-cigarette taxes, each of the contiguous 48 states (excluding those two counties), and Washington, DC. Standard errors are clustered by geographic cluster. Observations are weighted by the UPC’s sales in nontaxed clusters in that calendar year, divided by total sales across all UPCs in that year in nontaxed clusters. Panel A presents the first-stage and reduced-form, using the same set of controls as in our primary estimate in column 1 of panel B. Panel B presents the instrumental variables estimates. Time-varying state controls are the state unemployment rate and beer tax rate as well as indicators for whether the state has an indoor vaping ban, has a medical marijuana law, passed a prescription drug program, implemented a prescription drug program, and implemented the Medicaid expansion. Column 7 presents estimates in a “quasi-panel” in which we add zero-sales observations for all UPCs that had nonzero sales in cluster $s$ in any prior month, beginning with the month in which the UPC first had sales.
on cigarette and e-cigarette prices (instrumented by taxes), using an equation analogous to equation (16). The resulting substitution elasticities are $\chi^c \approx -0.13$ and $\hat{\chi}^c \approx 0.76$, respectively, with and without the cluster-specific trends. Online Appendix Figure A4 shows that without these linear time trends, there is an upward trend in cigarette purchases in the six quarters before an e-cigarette tax change. If that upward trend would have continued after the tax change, this would produce an upward-biased estimate of the cross-price elasticity $\chi^c$. This is why we also include the cluster-specific linear time controls in many specifications.  

Online Appendix Section D.1 presents additional robustness checks.

Online Appendix Section E.2 uses the cross-price elasticities to estimate the average substitution parameter $\sigma$. Beginning with $\chi^e$ from column 1 of Table 1 and using Slutsky symmetry and quasi-linear demand, we have a population average substitution parameter $\hat{\sigma} \approx -0.056$ (standard error (SE) $\approx 0.104$). Similarly, beginning with $\chi^c$ from online Appendix Table A3, we have $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{youth}} \approx 0.012$ (SE $\approx 0.025$) and $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{adult}} \approx 0.346$ (SE $\approx 0.707$). Combining these two estimates using a minimum distance estimator gives $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{youth}} \approx 0.0082$ (SE $\approx 0.0244$) and $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{adult}} \approx -0.046$ (SE $\approx 0.103$). Using the $\chi^e$ from column 5 of Table 1 (without the linear time trends) gives $\hat{\sigma} \approx -0.244$ (SE $\approx 0.128$).

These substitution parameter estimates are potentially credible because they are identified from tax changes in administrative data. However, we have seen that the point estimates are somewhat imprecise, the linear time trends seem to matter, and we are not able to estimate separate substitution elasticities for youth versus adults. An alternative approach to estimating the substitution parameter $\sigma_\theta$ would therefore be valuable.

IV. Substitution between Cigarettes and E-cigarettes

A. Graphical Illustrations

In this section, we extend the graphical discussion of cigarette smoking trends from Section IID into a formal empirical strategy for estimating the substitution parameter $\sigma$. While Section IID considered aggregate nationwide data, we now exploit the fact that e-cigarette demand varies substantially across demographic groups.

To demonstrate this demand variation, we regress e-cigarette use on a vector demographic group indicators $G_i$ using the following equation:

$$q^e_{it} = \kappa G_i + \xi^e_{it},$$

16 Using analogous regressions in the RMS data, Cotti et al. (2021) estimate an e-cigarette own-price elasticity of $-1.3$, closely in line with our estimates. They do not include linear time trends in any specification, and their cross-price elasticity estimates (estimated from $\chi^e$ and $\chi^c$) of 1.1 and 0.45 are comparable to our estimates when we exclude cluster-specific linear time trends.
where \( i \) indexes individuals in the sample surveys and \( t \) indexes years. Figure 4 presents results for adults and youth. White people (the omitted race category), men, non-college graduates, lower-income people, and younger adults (but older youth) have higher e-cigarette demand.\(^{17}\)

What explains this variation? Academic papers (Hartwell et al. 2017; Pepper et al. 2014; Perikleous et al. 2018) and industry sources (Bour 2019) discuss early adopters of e-cigarettes and often draw analogies to early adopters of other technologies. To explore this, online Appendix Figure A6 presents estimates of equation (18) for social media use in 2008 (Pew Research Center 2008) and internet use in 2000 (American National Election Studies 2001). As with e-cigarettes, men and younger adults were more likely to adopt these other new technologies. One difference is that people with less formal education are conditionally more likely to vape, whereas they were conditionally less likely to be early adopters of social media and the internet.

Figure 5 presents smoking and vaping trends for people with above- versus below-median predicted vaping \( \hat{G}_i \). Cigarette use is residual of dataset controls that address the 2011 BRFSS sampling frame change and rescale cigarette use to levels in the NSDUH. The figures show that high-vaping demographics also smoke more, and the high-vaping demographics have reduced smoking faster than low-vaping demographics. For both demographic groups, smoking has decreased steadily since 2004.

The \( y \)-axes on the right and left panels have the same scales, and \( \sigma \) is in units of cigarette packs per day vaped, so it translates between the left and right panels. In the survey data, the average day of smoking by an adult (youth) involves 0.5 (0.15) packs smoked. Thus, \( \sigma_\theta \approx 0.5 \) (\( \sigma_\theta \approx -0.5 \)) implies that the average smoking day and the average vaping day are perfect complements (perfect substitutes) for adults, and \( \sigma_\theta \approx 0.15 \) (\( \sigma_\theta \approx -0.15 \)) implies that they are perfect complements (perfect substitutes) for youth. The vertical red line before 2013 again marks the time when e-cigarette sales start to take off. If a vaping day and a smoking day were perfect complements (substitutes), one would expect that the relative cigarette consumption of high-vaping demographics would start to increase (or decrease) after 2013. In reality, it is difficult to visually detect any change in the smoking trends as e-cigarettes become popular.

Figure 6 continues this logic by presenting the difference in cigarette use between the same high- and low-vaping demographics. The dashed line is a time trend fitted only on pre-2013 data, while the solid line is a time trend fitted only on post-2013 data. The top (bottom) of the shaded area at the right of the figure presents the predicted difference in smoking if \( \sigma_\theta = 1 \) (\( \sigma_\theta = -1 \)), i.e., if daily vaping were a perfect complement (perfect substitute) for smoking one pack per day.\(^{18}\) For adults, the actual smoking difference is slightly below the pre-2013 prediction until 2018, but

\(^{17}\) Online Appendix Figure A5 shows that these patterns are similar across the multiple datasets that record vaping, although the estimated coefficients vary slightly.

\(^{18}\) To construct the perfect complement (substitute) predictions, we predict smoking using the pre-2013 time trend and then add (subtract) average vaping in the years when it is observed. Specifically, define \( \hat{q}_{Ht} \) and \( \hat{q}_{Lt} \) as the predicted smoking rates for people in high- and low-vaping demographics, and define \( q_{Ht}^e \) and \( q_{Lt}^e \) as their actual vaping rates in year \( t \). The perfect complement and substitute bounds for group \( g \in \{H,L\} \) are \( \hat{q}_{gt}^c \pm q_{gt}^e \). The bounds plotted on the figure are \( (\hat{q}_{Ht} - \hat{q}_{Lt}) \pm (q_{Ht} - q_{Lt}) \).
much closer to zero than to the $\sigma_\theta = -1$ bound. This suggests limited complementarity or substitutability. For youth, the actual smoking difference is almost exactly

Figure 4. Demographic Predictors of Vaping

Notes: These figures present coefficients from equation (18), a regression of vaping on demographic indicators. For adults, the omitted categories are White, female, college graduate, the lowest income quintile, and age group 18–24. For youth, the omitted categories are White, female, and grade 6. Panel A pools 2016–2018 data from BRFSS and NHIS; panel B pools 2014–2018 data from MTF and NYTS. Standard errors are clustered by demographic cell.
the same as the pre-2013 prediction, suggesting close to zero complementarity or substitutability.

Notes: These figures present combustible cigarette and e-cigarette use for demographics with above- versus below-median predicted vaping, as predicted by equation (18). Average cigarette use for each group is residual of data-set controls, which address the 2011 BRFSS sampling frame change and rescale cigarette use to levels in the NSDUH.
Figure 6. Difference in Smoking Trends for High versus Low Predicted Vaping

Notes: These figures present the difference in cigarette use for demographics with above- versus below-median predicted vaping, as predicted by equation (18). Average cigarette use for each group is residual of dataset controls, which address the 2011 BRFSS sampling frame change and rescale cigarette use to levels in the NSDUH. The perfect complement (substitute) bounds show the difference in cigarette use that would be expected if daily vaping were a perfect complement (substitute) for smoking one pack of cigarettes per day. To construct perfect complement (substitute) bounds, we predict the difference in cigarette use using the pre-2013 time trend, then add (subtract) the difference in share of days vaped.
Online Appendix Figures A7–A10 present versions of Figure 5 for splits of each specific demographic characteristic (sex, race, age/grade, education, and income). Online Appendix Figures A11–A14 present versions of Figure 6 for the most predictive split of each characteristic (e.g., Whites versus non-Whites, college versus non-college adults, etc.). These allow informal overidentification tests. The results are quite similar across all characteristics.19

B. Empirical Strategy

Our empirical strategy formalizes the graphical intuitions from above. We regress cigarette consumption on e-cigarette consumption using two-stage least squares (2SLS), instrumenting for e-cigarette consumption with demographic-by-time predictors and controlling for linear time trends. Let \( \nu_t \) denote year indicators, and let \( \mu_{dgt} \) denote “dataset controls” to address the sampling issues discussed in Section II.20

The second-stage regression is

\[
q_{it}^c = \sigma \hat{q}_{it}^e + \lambda \mathbf{G}_i + \omega (t - 2004) \mathbf{G}_i + \nu_t + \mu_{dgt} + \varepsilon_{it}.
\]

The inclusion of group-specific intercepts and time trends \( \mathbf{G}_i \) and \( (t - 2004) \mathbf{G}_i \) mean that we identify \( \sigma \) from changes in smoking conditional on those linear trends. However, because we now exploit demand variation across demographic groups, we can also include time dummies \( \nu_t \) that soak up demand shifts that are common across groups in levels, although not in proportions.

The instruments for vaping \( q_{it}^e \), denoted \( \mathbf{Z}_{it} \), are \( \mathbf{G}_i \cdot 1[t \geq 2013] \), \( \mathbf{G}_i \cdot 1[t \geq 2013] \cdot (t - 2012) \), and \( \mathbf{G}_i \cdot 1[t = 2018] \), where \( 1[\cdot] \) denotes the indicator function. The first two sets of instruments allow vaping to have different levels and trends by demographic group after vaping begins to grow in 2013. The third set is useful in fitting the 2018 increase in youth vaping seen in Figure 2.

The first stage is

\[
\hat{q}_{it}^e = \zeta \mathbf{Z}_{it} + \lambda^1 \mathbf{G}_i + \omega^1 (t - 2004) \mathbf{G}_i + \nu_t^1 + \mu_{dgt}^1 + \varepsilon_{it},
\]

where e-cigarette consumption \( \hat{q}_{it}^e \) is defined below, and “1” superscripts indicate first-stage parameters.

We must modify the first stage for two reasons. First, \( q_{it}^e \) is not recorded in any dataset for the years between when e-cigarettes were introduced and 2014 (for youth) or 2016 (for adults). We denote this initial year with vaping data as \( t \). Second, \( q_{it}^e \) is not recorded at all in the NSDUH data, and it is missing for about 10 percent

19 The one exception is income, which is like a weak instrument: there is little difference in vaping by income, and thus even small deviations from trends by income group are large when scaled by the small vaping difference.  
20 For adults and youth, \( \mu_{dgt} \) includes an indicator for each dataset (with NSDUH as the omitted dataset) interacted with the demographic indicators \( \mathbf{G}_i \). For adults, \( \mu_{dgt} \) also includes a pre-2011 indicator and a pre-2011 BRFSS indicator, both interacted with \( \mathbf{G}_i \). The \( \mu_{dgt} \) controls thereby address the variability introduced by BRFSS and NYTS sampling and rescale smoking to levels in the NSDUH.
of adult observations and 30 percent of youth observations in dataset-years when it is supposed to be recorded.

To address the missing $q_{it}^e$ for early years, we impute the averages by demographic group assuming linear growth from zero in 2012 to the level in year $t$. This assumption is motivated by the sales trends from Figure 1, which showed limited vaping until 2013 and roughly linear growth for the several years after that. We predict vaping by demographic group by estimating equation (18) with data from year $t$, giving demographic coefficients $\hat{\kappa}_i$, and then construct observed or imputed vaping as follows:

$$\hat{q}_{it}^e = \begin{cases} \hat{\kappa}_i G_i \cdot \frac{q_{it}^e, t-2012}{t-2012}, & t \geq t \\ 0, & 2013 \leq t < t-1 \\ t \leq 2012 \end{cases}$$

We carry out this imputation in all datasets other than NSDUH.

To address the missing vaping data in the NSDUH (for all years) and in other datasets (beginning in year $t$), we use two-sample 2SLS. We estimate the first stage (equation (20)) in all datasets other than NSDUH, construct the fitted values $\hat{q}_{it}^e$ for all observations, and run the second stage (equation (19)) with all observations. We bootstrap the entire procedure including imputation steps and draw bootstrap samples by demographic cell.

This approach is a cousin of the “shift-share” identification strategy popularized by Bartik (1991) and Blanchard and Katz (1992), and discussed in Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin, and Swift (2019): we primarily exploit cross-sectional variation in demand across demographic groups with the time-series growth of e-cigarette use. The exclusion restriction is that the instruments affected post-2013 smoking only through vaping—intuitively, that there would have been no changes in smoking trends for higher- versus lower-vaping demographics if e-cigarettes had not been introduced.

We provide two types of suggestive evidence in favor of the exclusion restriction. First, we conduct informal overidentification tests using different demographic groups as instruments. Since the estimates remain stable across different demographic groups, then any potential confounder must have affected all demographic groups. Second, we present graphical event studies that test for trends in smoking in demographics with high versus low latent e-cigarette demand, before e-cigarettes were introduced. If there are no such trends, then any potential confounder must have arisen at the same time as e-cigarettes became popular.

The event study regression is analogous to our second stage (equation (19)), except that $\zeta$ is allowed to vary by year:

$$q_{it}^C = \zeta_i (\hat{\kappa} G_i) + \lambda G_i + \omega(t - 2004) G_i + \nu_i + \mu_d g + \varepsilon_{it},$$

21 We impute predicted values with dataset controls for the NSDUH by assuming that NSDUH is the average of NHIS and post-2011 BRFSS.
where $\zeta_t$ is a vector of time-varying coefficients and $\hat{k}_G_i$ is the fitted value from an estimate of equation (18) using vaping in all years observed. Because we have demographic group intercepts and time trends and $\hat{k}_G_i$ varies only by demographic group, we must omit at least two years from the $\zeta_t$ parameters. The more years we omit, the more precisely we can estimate the time trends $\omega$. We estimate one indicator for the combined 2004–2010 period and one for each individual year after, omitting 2012, the year before vaping starts to become popular.

C. Event Study Figures

Figure 7 presents estimates of the $\zeta_t$ parameters from equation (22), the event study specification. For adults, the 2004–2010 and 2011 indicators are very close to the omitted year (2012), implying no differential smoking trends prior to e-cigarette introduction for demographic groups with higher versus lower e-cigarette demand. The estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero in any year.

For youth, the 2004–2010 point estimate is below the omitted year, and the 2011 estimate is slightly above, although the latter difference is not statistically significant with 95 percent confidence. Consistent with Figure 6, the point estimates are very close to zero in the years after e-cigarettes are introduced.

D. Parameter Estimates

The first row of Table 2 presents estimates of $\sigma$ from equation (19). For adults (youth), the primary point estimates are $\hat{\sigma}_\theta \approx 0.03 (\hat{\sigma}_\theta \approx 0.01)$. This implies that groups that are 10 percentage points more likely to vape on a given day increased smoking by 0.003 (0.001) packs per day relative to trend. Both adult and youth estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero. We can rule out $\sigma$ coefficients of less than $-0.16$ or more than 0.29 for adults (less than $-0.03$ or more than 0.06 for youth) with 95 percent confidence.

Online Appendix Section E.1 presents robustness checks. To argue that vaping is a stronger complement or substitute to smoking over our sample period, one would have to believe that some unobserved force increased or decreased smoking over the exact period that vaping became popular, breaking a previously steady downward trend. Since online Appendix Section E.1 shows that point estimates move little when we exclude any given demographic characteristic from the instruments, one would also have to believe that this unobserved force affected all demographic groups.

The rest of Table 2 helps to put the results in context. We multiply $\hat{\sigma}_\theta$ for $\theta \in \{\text{adults, youth}\}$ by 2018 average vaping $q_\theta$ to estimate the change in smoking caused by the introduction of e-cigarettes. For the average adult, we can reject with 95 percent confidence that vaping increased (decreased) smoking by 0.007 (0.004) packs per day, or about 8 percent (4 percent) of average cigarette consumption. For the average youth, we can rule out with 95 percent confidence that vaping increased (decreased) smoking by more than 0.003 (0.001) packs per day, or about 52 (22) percent of average consumption. We cannot rule out effects that have not yet manifested themselves as of the 2018 surveys—for example, if high-vaping youth demographics will transition to smoking over a longer period.
Figure 7. Event Study of E-cigarette Introduction

Notes: These figures present estimates of $\zeta$ from equation (22), a regression of cigarette use on predicted vaping interacted with year indicators, controlling for linear time trends and other controls. We estimate one indicator for the 2004–2010 period, and 2012 is the omitted year category. The confidence intervals reflect the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of estimates from 200 bootstrap replications, where we draw bootstrap samples by demographic cell.
Aggregating across all adults and youth, we can rule out that the introduction of e-cigarettes increased (decreased) smoking by more than about 660 (354) million packs in 2018. Furthermore, we can rule out that the introduction of e-cigarettes changed cigarette demand by more than 5–11 percent of the total decrease observed from 2004 to 2018. Thus, these estimates suggest that while e-cigarettes may be smoking cessation aids from some people and gateways to smoking for others, neither effect dominates in an economically significant way.

V. Expert Survey

A. Health Harms Overview

The National Academy of Sciences (2018, 17) report stated that “e-cigarette products contain and emit numerous potentially toxic substances,” but combustible cigarettes have a much higher quantity of toxic substances. The report described two modes of action, endothelial cell dysfunction and oxidative stress, through which inhaling e-cigarette vapors could cause a range of diseases. The report then discussed several types of diseases, including cardiovascular disease, cancer, and respiratory disease, that might be affected. The report (ibid., 1) said that “e-cigarettes are likely to be far less harmful than combustible tobacco cigarettes.”

Notes: This table presents estimates of the substitution parameter \( \sigma_{\theta} := \frac{d q}{d q_{\theta}} \) and further analysis. We compute the effect of vaping on smoking (packs/day) by multiplying \( \hat{\sigma} \) by average vaping. We compute the effect of vaping on smoking (percent) by dividing the effect of vaping on smoking (packs/day) by average packs per day smoked in 2018. We compute the effect of vaping on smoking in 2018 (million packs) by multiplying the effect of vaping on smoking (percent) by the total smoking in 2018 (million packs) implied by the sample survey data. We compute the effect of vaping on smoking (percent of decrease) by dividing the effect of vaping on smoking (packs per day) by the change in packs per day smoked from 2004 to 2018. The confidence intervals for \( \hat{\sigma} \) reflect the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of estimates from 200 bootstrap replications, where we draw bootstrap samples by demographic cell.
Other prior assessments agreed that vaping is materially less harmful than smoking cigarettes. A prominent early assessment from 12 experts suggested that e-cigarettes were only 5 percent as harmful as combustible cigarettes (Nutt et al. 2014). Public Health England argued that “based on current knowledge, stating that vaping is at least 95 percent less harmful than smoking remains a good way to communicate the large difference in relative risk” (McNeill et al. 2018, 20). Viscusi (2016) argued that early evidence suggested that vaping could be at least 100 times safer than smoking. However, the prior assessments express substantial uncertainty. Nutt et al. (2014, 224) wrote that there was a “lack of hard evidence” for their conclusions, and the National Academy of Sciences (2018, 2) report wrote that “little is known” about e-cigarettes’ health harms. Furthermore, there is substantial disagreement among researchers, and the science appears to be changing. Eissenberg et al. (2020, 162) argue that the Nutt et al. (2014) assessment is outdated and unreliable because e-cigarettes and e-liquids are more harmful than they were a few years ago and “evidence of potential harm has accumulated.” An anti-tobacco research organization (Truth Initiative 2020) argues that “the growing evidence of potential health risks related to e-cigarette use has led some researchers to question whether e-cigarettes are safer than combustible cigarettes.” They further argue that:

While a 2018 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report found substantial evidence that exposure to toxic substances from e-cigarettes is significantly lower compared to combustible cigarettes, recent studies are showing that is not the end of the story on health impact. It now appears that e-cigarettes may present their own unique health risks, including to the respiratory and cardiovascular systems.

B. Survey Overview

Motivated by the uncertainty and quickly evolving evidence about health harms, we fielded a survey of e-cigarette experts that makes two advances: it measures a more current state of expert opinion as informed by the latest research, and it does so in a quantitative format appropriate for policy analysis. Our sample frame was, after excluding people with tobacco industry affiliations: (i) the 13 committee members, 13 reviewers, and 122 corresponding authors of papers on the health impacts of e-cigarettes from the landmark National Academy of Sciences (2018) report; (ii) the 113 editors, contributing authors, and reviewers of the 2020 Surgeon General Report on smoking cessation; (iii) the 91 editors, contributing editors, contributing authors, and reviewers of the 2016 Surgeon General Report on e-cigarettes; (iv) the 34 people who served on the FDA Tobacco Product Scientific Advisory Committee between 2017 and 2020; (v) the 65 people who have been honored as Fellows of the Society for Research on Nicotine and Tobacco; (vi) the
70 editors, senior editors, and senior associate editors at three leading academic journals (Tobacco Regulatory Science, Tobacco Control, and Nicotine and Tobacco Research), as well as the 62 associate editors at the latter two journals; and (vii) the 55 authors of papers about cigarettes or e-cigarettes cited in Cutler et al. (2015); Chaloupka, Levy, and White (2019); and our September 2019 draft. Many people qualified through multiple inclusion criteria. The initial sample frame included 432 “public health experts” who qualified for reasons (i)–(vi) and another 50 “economists” who qualified only for reason (vii). We were unable to find email addresses for 15 people, and another 20 explicitly reported that they did not feel they were experts on the health effects of vaping, leaving 447 eligible experts.

We fielded the survey in August 2020. Of the 447 eligible experts, 190 consented to the survey. Of those who consented, 34 dropped out before finishing the description of the randomized experiment, and another 21 did not complete the survey. Feedback from participants suggested that this attrition was due to a combination of the length of the survey, feeling that they were not experts on the health effects of vaping, concerns that eliciting confidence intervals on respondents’ beliefs (described below) was insufficient to reflect uncertainty, concerns that the survey was inappropriate because our hypothetical randomized trial (described below) would not be ethical, and concerns that our hypothetical randomized trial did not contemplate dual use of both e-cigarettes and cigarettes. Our survey completion rate was 137/447, or 31 percent.

C. Survey Questions

The survey began by asking, “over the past five years, approximately how many peer-reviewed research papers have you published on the health effects of e-cigarettes or combustible cigarettes?”

To be precise about the parameters we wanted to elicit, the survey then described a hypothetical randomized trial that compares vaping and smoking.

To be concrete, we’ll ask you to predict the effects of a hypothetical randomized control trial with a random sample of people in the US who currently smoke or vape or might do so in the future. Participants would be assigned one of three groups:

1. “Smoking group”: Smoke one pack of typical cigarettes every day

2. “Vaping group”: Vape every day using typical e-cigarettes currently available in the US, consuming a comparable amount of nicotine as the smoking group

3. “Control group”: Not vape or smoke at all

• Please assume there is no dual use: the smoking group does not vape, and the vaping group does not smoke cigarettes.
• Please assume the experiment starts next year and continues for a long time, with full compliance.
• Please assume that participants in the experiment do not use illegal products and do not vape or smoke THC/marijuana. (This is because we want to evaluate regulations that only affect the use of legal products.)

—The 2019 outbreak of e-cigarette product use-associated lung injury (EVALI) was largely linked to use of e-liquids containing THC. We ask you to ignore any EVALI or other health effects that you think are caused by illegal products or THC.

It’s important for the rest of the survey that we’ve clearly communicated this hypothetical randomized trial (random sample of current or possible future smokers or vapers, comparable amount of nicotine, typical legal products, full compliance, no THC, etc.). If you understand, please continue. If something is unclear, please email the PI at hunt.allcott@nyu.edu and we’ll answer your question quickly.

Part 1: predicted effects on health outcomes. The first part of the survey asked experts to predict the effects on health outcomes (cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, cancer, other health problems, mortality, and quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE)) for vaping compared to smoking in our hypothetical randomized trial. For example, the QALE question read:

If smoking one pack per day reduces quality-adjusted life expectancy (compared to Control) by 100 units, by how many units do you think vaping every day would reduce quality-adjusted life expectancy (compared to Control)?

• If vaping and smoking have equal effects on morbidity and mortality, your answer would be 100 units.
• If vaping is much more harmful than smoking, your answer might be much larger than 100.
• If vaping is much less harmful than smoking, your answer might be close to 0.

We also included a graphical illustration; see online Appendix Figure A16.

Much of our analysis focuses on this QALE question. We define $\alpha$ as the response to this question, divided by 100. After this question, we also asked experts to report their 90 percent confidence intervals on $\alpha$.

Part 2: reasons for disagreement with prior assessments. The second part of the survey was designed to understand whether and why our experts’ views might differ from the assessments of Nutt et al. (2014) and McNeill et al. (2018).

To measure sample selection bias, the survey told experts that “we’d like to get your sense of whether you think you are more optimistic or pessimistic about vaping than the average public health expert,” reminded them of their $\alpha$, and asked “what do you think the average expert would report?” The survey then presented a confirmation
screen stating that “your answer implies that you are [are more optimistic/are more pessimistic/have the same views] about the health effects of vaping [than/as] the average expert,” and asked them to confirm that they were satisfied with their answers.

The survey then asked, “How optimistic or pessimistic are you about the health effects of vaping now, compared to five years ago?” Experts who reported that they were more optimistic or pessimistic than they were five years ago were then asked to select reasons why their views had changed.

The survey then reminded experts of past assessments of $\alpha$:

Public Health England (2018) concluded that “Based on current knowledge, stating that vaping is at least 95 percent less harmful than smoking remains a good way to communicate the large difference in relative risk.” A paper by Nutt et al. (2014) came to a similar conclusion.

For experts who had reported $\alpha \neq 0.05$, the survey then said, “You predicted that the relative effect of vaping for quality-adjusted life expectancy was $[\alpha \times 100]$ units, i.e., $[\alpha \times 100]$ percent of the relative effect of smoking. By that measure, you are more [pessimistic/optimistic] about vaping than Nutt et al. (2014) and Public Health England (2018). Why? (Please select all that apply.)” One of the possible responses was “I misunderstood the questions. I would like to click the back arrow and change my answers.” Any experts who clicked that response were required to go back before continuing. Thus, all experts who disagreed with prior assessments were required to explicitly confirm and explain their disagreement.

**Part 3: internalities for youth versus adults.** The third part of the survey was designed to elicit the internalities for youth relative to adults. The survey said,

*A final key parameter is the harm e-cigarettes impose on the user that the user does not correctly perceive.* (The italicized text is important: users may have some perception of personal harms, and we are asking you about the difference between that perception and reality.) Misperceptions might arise from:

- misunderstanding the health risks,
- misunderstanding the likelihood of addiction or the difficulty of quitting, and/or
- focusing too much on the present benefits instead of the long-run health harms.

The survey then asked, “Imagine that vaping every day causes 100 units of actual harms on [adults/youth]. How many units do you think the average [adult/youth] perceives?” We define a variable $\rho$ measuring experts’ beliefs about the ratio of internalities for youth compared to adults: $\rho := 1 + (\text{adult perceived harms} - \text{youth perceived harms})/100$. For example, $\rho = 1$ for experts who believe that adults and youth perceive the same harms, and $\rho = 1 + (70 - 20)/100 = 1.5$ for experts who believe that adults perceive 70 percent of the actual harms and youth perceive 20 percent.

**Confirmation Checks.**—To ensure that experts understood the questions and gave thoughtful answers, we included confirmation checks after every major question in
the survey. Experts were required to affirm that they agreed with a given confirmation check and were satisfied with their answers. If they did not explicitly affirm, they were required to click backward in the survey and adjust their previous answers until they were satisfied. Respondents were always allowed to go back and change their answers on any question.

For example, in one confirmation check after eliciting beliefs about the relative effects of vaping on life expectancy, we also elicited beliefs about the effect of a lifetime of daily smoking on life expectancy, which is thought to be more than 10 years (US Department of Health and Human Services 2014), and then confirmed that they agreed that a lifetime of daily vaping would have the effect implied by their answers. Thus, an expert who reported that the effect of vaping on life expectancy would be 40 percent as large as the effect of smoking and that lifetime smoking reduces life expectancy by 10 years would be required to confirm that she believed that lifetime vaping would reduce life expectancy by 4 years. As a result of this and the other confirmation checks, it would be hard to argue that experts misunderstood the survey.

D. Expert Survey Results

Figure 8 presents the distribution of $\alpha$ across experts. The mean (median) expert believes that the effect of vaping on quality-adjusted life expectancy would be 37 (25) percent as large as the effect of smoking. There is substantial disagreement across experts: the interquartile range is 10 to 60 percent. Individual experts also perceive substantial uncertainty: the average expert reported a 90 percent confidence interval spanning 32 percentage points.

Seventy-eight percent of experts reported $\alpha > 0.05$. As described above, these experts all explicitly confirmed on our survey instrument that they were more pessimistic than the conclusion of Nutt et al. (2014) and McNeill et al. (2018) that vaping is at least 95 percent safer than smoking. Forty-four percent of experts reported that $\alpha = 0.05$ was below the lower bound of their 90 percent confidence interval.

Experts’ beliefs about the relative effects on (unadjusted) life expectancy are similar to their beliefs about the relative effects on QALE: the mean (median) expert believes that the effect of vaping on life expectancy would be 38 (30) percent as large as the effect of smoking; see online Appendix Figure A17. Experts report that vaping has material effects (relative to smoking) on cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, cancer, and other health outcomes, although they believe that the relative effects are smaller for cancer than for other diseases; see online Appendix Figure A18. Regressions in online Appendix Table A8 show that beliefs about effects on cardiovascular disease, respiratory disease, and cancer all predict beliefs about QALE and life expectancy, although the point estimates suggest that respiratory disease is a weaker predictor of mortality than it is of QALE, while cancer and cardiovascular disease are slightly stronger predictors of mortality. These results show that experts’ beliefs about effects on QALE correspond to their beliefs about the effects on specific health conditions.

Our average public health (economist) expert reported having published 6 (1) peer reviewed research paper(s) on the health effects of e-cigarettes and combustible cigarettes in the past five years. There is no relationship between $\alpha$ and this
measure of expertise; see online Appendix Figure A19. Public health experts, who have published more papers in this area, report higher $\alpha$ than the economists; see online Appendix Figure A20.

Several facts suggest that sample selection bias does not explain why our experts disagree with prior work. First, as illustrated in online Appendix Figure A21, our experts report being slightly more optimistic than average about e-cigarettes: the mean (median) respondent believes that the average public health expert would report an $\alpha$ of 41 (40). Taking this result at face value suggests that sample selection might bias $\alpha$ slightly downwards. Second, we sent three survey invite emails spaced six days apart, and almost all responses came within two days of an email being sent. There is no statistically detectable correlation between $\alpha$ and whether the experts responded in the days after the first, second, or third invite, meaning that experts who are more eager to respond do not have systematically different views; see online Appendix Figure A22. Third, we can bound the possible effects of sample selection bias using our 31 percent response rate: even in an extreme case where all non-respondents would have reported $\alpha = 0$, the average $\alpha$ in our sample of eligible experts would be $0.37 \times 0.31 \approx 0.11$, still more than twice the prior assessment that $\alpha \leq 0.05$.

The second part of our survey allows us to understand why our experts disagree with prior assessments. Experts report that their own personal views have evolved over time: 45 percent of experts report being more pessimistic about the health effects of vaping now compared to five years ago, against 34 percent who report

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**Figure 8. Expert Survey: Effects of Vaping on Quality-Adjusted Life Expectancy**

Notes: Our expert survey asked, “If smoking one pack per day reduces quality-adjusted life expectancy (compared to Control) by 100 units, by how many units do you think vaping every day would reduce quality-adjusted life expectancy (compared to Control)?” This figure presents the distribution of responses across experts, after dividing by 100. Ninety-three percent of experts who completed the survey responded to this question.
having “about the same view” and 20 percent who report being more optimistic. When asked why their views have changed, 92 percent reported that “there is new research evidence,” and 56 percent reported that “e-cigarette devices have changed.”

Figure 9 shows that these same factors explain why most of our expert respondents disagree with the assessments of Nutt et al. (2014) and McNeill et al. (2018) that $\alpha \leq 0.05$. 52, 45, and 47 percent of experts who reported $\alpha > 0.05$ responded that “there is new research evidence,” “e-cigarette devices have changed,” and “I disagree with how the researchers interpreted the research evidence available at the time,” respectively. Our average expert thus explicitly agrees with the arguments of Eissenberg et al. (2020) and others that e-cigarettes and e-liquids are more harmful than they were a few years ago and that “evidence of potential harm has accumulated.”

On the final part of the survey, the mean (median) expert reported that misperceptions of the harms from vaping are 47 (30) percentage points larger for youth than for adults; see online Appendix Figure A25. Thus, $\rho \approx 1 + 47/100 = 1.47$ for the average expert.

Online Appendix Section F presents additional information on the expert survey. The three key results above—material harms relative to combustible cigarettes, substantial uncertainty, and larger harms for youth compared to adults—will be central to our welfare analysis in the next section.

### VI. Optimal Regulation

#### A. Parameter Calibrations

In this section, we estimate the optimal e-cigarette tax using equation (14) and the welfare effects of an e-cigarette ban using equation (15). We use Monte Carlo simulations to capture the sampling variation in each parameter. Specifically, we re-estimate equations (14) and (15) one million times, drawing each parameter from its distribution. Unless otherwise stated below, we draw each parameter from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation equal to its point estimate and standard error. We will also present extensive sensitivity analyses under alternative parameter assumptions.

Table 3 summarizes the parameters, their mean values in our primary simulations, and their sources. We use parameters from 2018, the final year of our survey data, and we inflate monetary amounts to 2018 dollars (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021a). We consider two consumer types $\theta \in \{a, y\}$, representing adults and youth.

We use the empirical estimate of $\eta$ from Table 1 and the adult and youth $\sigma$ from online Appendix Figure A15. To avoid implausibly small or positive own-price elasticities, we redraw any $\eta > -0.1$; this happens in only 0.16 percent of simulations. We compute $s_\theta$, the share of each type, by calculating the number of youth ages 12–17 and adults ages 18–100 in the 2018 American Community Survey (IPUMS).

We use US Census Bureau (2020) data to construct 2018 population-weighted average local tax rates $\bar{\tau}_c$ and $\bar{\tau}_e \approx \$0.46/ml, and we use $\bar{p}_e \approx \$3.89/ml$ from our E-cigarette User Survey. Only about 26 percent of the US population lived in states, counties, or cities with e-cigarette taxes in 2018, so $\bar{\tau}_e$ is considerably less than the
population-weighted average tax rate in areas that had taxes, which is $1.74/ml.
Except in row 13 of Table 4, we consider an e-cigarette tax or ban holding cigarette
taxes constant at the status quo $\tau^c$.

Youth and adult e-cigarette consumption $q^e_\theta(p)$ are the 2018 averages from
the sample surveys plotted in Figure 2. Vaping is now in units of milliliters per
person-day, and the e-cigarette tax rate and marginal distortion are in dollars per ml.
We transform $q^e_\theta$ from the original survey units (share of days) to ml/person-day
using $\Gamma$, the e-liquid consumption on an average vaping day from our E-cigarette
User Survey.

Externalities.—We import the Sloan et al. (2004) average marginal externality
from smoking, except that we follow DeCicca, Kenkel, and Lovenheim (2020) in
removing the component from life insurance cross-subsidies, as most life insurance
policies now adjust for smoking status. This gives $\phi^c \approx$ $0.64$ per pack in 2018 US
dollars.

We assume that the harms from smoking can be translated to harms from vaping
using $\alpha$, the relative effects of vaping on health. To recognize the complementary
value from expert reviews such as McNeill et al. (2018) and our expert survey,
our simulations place equal weight on $\alpha = 0.05$ and draws from our experts’
distribution of $\alpha$.\footnote{To account for both disagreement across experts and individual-level uncertainty, in each Monte Carlo simulation using our expert survey distribution, we first draw one expert and then draw $\alpha$ from a uniform distribution centered at that expert’s $\alpha$ with support equal to $10/9$ times the width of that expert’s reported 90 percent confidence interval, winsorizing at $\alpha \geq 0$.} Since we asked experts to contemplate the effects of smoking one pack per day versus vaping an equivalent amount of nicotine every day, we translate smoking harms (in $\$/pack) to vaping harms (in $\$/ml) by multiplying by $\alpha/\Lambda$, where $\Lambda$ is the volume of e-liquid that delivers the same amount of nicotine as a pack of cigarettes. $\Lambda$ depends heavily on usage patterns, but since the popular 0.7 ml Juul pod is advertised as delivering about the same amount of nicotine as a pack of cigarettes (Willett et al. 2019), we assume $\Lambda = 0.7$ ml/pack. The externality from vaping is thus $\phi^c = \phi^c \alpha/\Lambda \approx 0.19$/ml at our mean $\alpha$.

Internalities.—For our primary simulations, we follow Cutler et al. (2015) in assuming that the marginal bias from adult smoking is $\gamma_a^c = (1 - \beta)H^c$, where $\beta$ is the present focus parameter and $H^c$ is the discounted private cost of smoking per pack. As we showed in an example in Section I, this is the correct formula for marginal bias if present focus is the only behavioral bias, the social planner uses the long-run criterion (so that normative utility uses exponential discounting), and there is no habit formation. With habit formation, $\gamma_a^c$ would be smaller with sophisticated present focus and probably larger with naive present focus (Gruber and K˝oszegi 2001). Projection bias would probably increase $\gamma_a^c$. We use the stylized $\gamma_a^c = (1 - \beta)H^c$ because of these modeling uncertainties.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Data source</th>
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<td>$\eta$</td>
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<td>Population share youth</td>
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<td>2018 American Community Survey</td>
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<td>$\gamma^c$</td>
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Notes: This table summarizes the parameters used for policy analysis. All dollar values are inflated to 2018 US dollars. BRFSS, NHIS, MTF, and NYTS refer to sample surveys described in online Appendix Table A2. Cigarette and e-liquid tax rates are averages across all US states, weighted by population; the cigarette tax includes the federal cigarette tax of $1.01 per pack but excludes sub-state taxes.
We assume that the present discounted private health cost from smoking is \( H_c = 44.40 \) per pack, inflating the estimate from Gruber and Kőszegi (2001) to 2018 US dollars. For adults, our simulations place equal weight on two different assessments of present focus: \( \beta = 0.67 \) and its standard error as estimated by Chaloupka, Levy, and White (2019), and \( \beta = 0.9 \) as assumed by Gruber and Kőszegi (2001). At our mean \( \beta \) and \( \alpha \), the internality from adult smoking is thus \( \gamma_a^c = (1 - \beta) H_c \approx 9.55 \) per pack, and the internality from adult vaping is \( \gamma_a^e = (1 - \beta) H_c \alpha / \Lambda \approx 2.88 \) per ml. For youth, we inflate internalities by \( \rho \), the ratio of youth to adult internalities from the expert survey, giving \( \gamma_y^e = \rho \gamma_a^e \). We draw \( \rho \) from the empirical distribution in online Appendix Figure A25.

Online Appendix Section G provides additional details about the welfare analysis and empirical implementation.
B. Optimal Regulation Results

Three Key Parameters.—Three key parameters drive our results on optimal regulation. First, we estimate that e-cigarette demand is more than unit elastic. This relatively elastic demand reduces the perceived consumer surplus from vaping, pushing toward the possibility that a ban might increase welfare.

Second, our point estimates of the substitution parameter $\sigma$ imply very limited complementarity or substitutability between e-cigarettes and cigarettes. This means that in our mean Monte Carlo simulation, optimal e-cigarette policy places little weight on cigarette market distortions. However, cigarette market distortions will matter when $\sigma$ is further from zero.

Third, the e-cigarette internality assumptions generate substantial uncertainty. With our smaller assumptions for present focus ($\beta = 0.9$) and health harms ($\alpha = 0.05$), the adult vaping internality is $\gamma_a^e = (1 - \beta) H^c \alpha / \Lambda \approx (1 - 0.9) \times \$44.40 \times 0.05 / 0.7 \approx \$0.32 / \text{ml}$. With larger present focus from Chaloupka, Levy, and White (2019) ($\beta = 0.67$) and larger health harms from our expert survey (mean $\alpha \approx 0.37$), we have $\gamma_a^e \approx (1 - 0.67) \times \$44.40 \times 0.37 / 0.7 \approx \$7.81 / \text{ml}$. The difference between these two $\gamma_a^e$ benchmarks is more than four times larger than the $\$1.74 / \text{ml}$ average e-cigarette tax in states, counties, and cities that had taxes in 2018. Furthermore, the latter $\gamma_a^e$ has substantial uncertainty driven by the variation in $\alpha$ from our expert survey and the standard errors on $\beta$ from Chaloupka, Levy, and White (2019), and inflating the internality by $\rho$ for youth further increases variance. Online Appendix Figure A26 further quantifies the importance of parameter uncertainty for optimal policy; uncertainty about the harms from e-cigarettes ($\alpha$ and $\beta$) contributes the most to the variance displayed in the following simulations.

Monte Carlo Simulation Results.—Panel A of Figure 10 presents optimal e-cigarette tax rates over the distribution of Monte Carlo simulation draws. Uncertainty about health harms drives the long right tail of optimal tax rates. In the mean simulation, the optimal tax is $\$3.73 / \text{ml}$. As discussed in Section I, the optimal tax could be negative (i.e., a subsidy) if cigarettes are much more harmful than e-cigarettes and the two goods are substitutes. While this is the case in some simulations, the optimal tax is positive 91 percent of the time. By contrast, 26 percent of the US population was subject to an e-cigarette tax as of 2018. The solid vertical line marks the $\$0.46 / \text{ml}$ nationwide average tax rate in 2018; the optimal tax exceeds that average in 76 percent of simulations. The dashed vertical line marks the $\$1.74 / \text{ml}$ average e-cigarette tax in states and local areas that had taxes in 2018; the optimal tax exceeds that average in 47 percent of simulations.

Panel B presents the welfare effects of an e-cigarette ban. Recall that in our model, the optimal tax is always preferred to a ban, and we compare a ban to the 2018 status quo tax rates. Thus, a ban increases welfare when status quo tax rates are much lower than optimal. In the mean simulation, a full e-cigarette ban increases welfare by $\$8.90$ per person per year, or $\$2.5$ billion per year over the 279 million people aged 12 and older nationwide. A ban increases welfare in 44 percent of simulations.
Simulations at Different $\alpha$.—Panels A and B of Figure 11 present the mean and 95 percent confidence intervals for the optimal e-cigarette tax and welfare effects of a ban for a range of $\alpha$ from 0 to 1. At the $\alpha = 0.05$ inspired by prior assessments of health harms, the optimal e-cigarette tax in the mean simulation is $1.20/\text{ml}$, and
banning e-cigarettes reduces welfare by about $5 per person per year. At \( \alpha \approx 0.1 \), the optimal tax is positive in about 95 percent of simulations, and a ban is approximately welfare-neutral in the mean simulation. At the \( \alpha \approx 0.37 \) corresponding to our average expert’s beliefs about health harms, the optimal tax is $6.27/ml, and the ban increases welfare in nearly 95 percent of simulations.

**Alternative Assumptions.**—Table 4 presents optimal tax rates and welfare effects of a ban under alternative parameter assumptions. In each row of panels A and B, we present the mean \( \tau_e^* \) or \( \Delta W \) at the parameter assumption listed in the first column for \( \alpha = 0.05 \) and for \( \alpha = 0.37 \), drawing the other parameters from their distributions.

Rows 1–6 present alternative assumptions about internalities. Row 1 corresponds to the primary estimates described above. Rows 2 and 3 vary the present focus parameter between \( \beta = 0.9 \) and \( \beta = 0.67 \). Only for the most optimistic combination of \( \alpha = 0.05 \) and \( \beta = 0.9 \) is the optimal tax below the 2018 norm of $1.74/ml.

Row 4 considers the implications of evidence presented by Viscusi (2016, 2020); Elton-Marshall et al. (2020); McNeill et al. (2018); and others that people overestimate the risks of vaping relative to smoking. The ideal policy instrument to address incorrect beliefs about the health effects of vaping would be information provision, and the results of Jin et al. (2015) suggest that information provision policies had substantial effects on smoking prevalence from 1964 to 2010. However, if e-cigarette public health information campaigns are not fully effective, it could be optimal to subsidize e-cigarettes to offset remaining misperceptions. The average respondent in Viscusi (2020, Table 2) believes that 28 percent of people who vape and 43 percent of cigarette smokers will die from lung cancer, heart disease, throat cancer, or any other illness because they vape or smoke. If we interpret 28/43 as consumers’ perception of relative health harms for a day of vaping relative to a day of smoking, the internality from incorrect beliefs is \( \gamma_e = \frac{H}{\alpha - 28/43} \). If the true \( \alpha \) is 0.05, we have \( \gamma_e \approx \frac{44.40(0.05 - 28/43)}{0.7} \approx -38 \). If \( \alpha = 0.37 \), we have \( \gamma_e \approx \frac{44.40(0.37 - 28/43)}{0.7} \approx -18 \).

Rows 5 and 6 present alternative internality assumptions. Row 5 uses the internality estimate of \( \gamma_a = $4.16/ml \) from Jin et al. (2015). The results are very similar to those in row 2 with \( \beta = 0.9 \). Row 6 assumes that the conventional wisdom of policymakers is more informative about the marginal distortion from smoking than the academic research we use in our primary estimates. In that row, we assume that existing average cigarette taxes \( \bar{\tau}_c \) are set optimally by setting the smoking marginal distortion equal to the tax: \( \phi_c = \bar{\tau}_c \). We then translate that smoking distortion to vaping using the relative health harms: \( \phi_{\theta e} = \phi_c \alpha \Gamma / \Lambda \). This reduces \( \phi_c \), \( \phi_e \), and the resulting optimal e-cigarette tax.

Rows 7–12 present alternative assumptions for the substitution parameter \( \sigma \). Since smoking involves uninternalized negative distortions (\( \phi^c > \bar{\tau}_c \)), more

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25 These numbers are so large because smoking substantially reduces life expectancy, consumers substantially overestimate the mortality effects of vaping relative to smoking, and the value of a statistical life is in the millions of dollars. However, these calculations imply that consumers would be willing to pay $18 to $38 more per ml if they could be debiased of their health risk misperceptions. Given the current average price of \( \bar{p}_e \approx $3.89 per ml, such large effects seem implausible. Perhaps the effects of belief bias on choice are diminished by severe inattention or present bias. In the absence of additional data, we think of these results as illustrative.
substitutability (more negative $\sigma$) makes the optimal e-cigarette tax and welfare gains from a ban less positive (or more negative), while more complementarity (more positive $\sigma$) pushes in the other direction. Row 7 uses the minimum distance estimates from the Nielsen RMS data in Section III with cluster-specific linear time trends, $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{adult}} \approx -0.046$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{\text{youth}} \approx 0.0082$, which suggest slightly more substitutability between smoking and vaping. Row 8 uses the $\hat{\sigma}$ and $\hat{\eta}$ estimates without cluster-specific linear time trends, which imply more substitutability and slightly
more inelastic demand. Row 9 uses the \( \hat{\sigma} \) parameters from both Section III (with linear time trends) and Section IV, combined using a minimum distance estimator as described in online Appendix Section E.2. Rows 10 and 11 present results assuming that an average day of vaping is a perfect complement (\( \sigma = 0.5 \) for adults and \( \sigma = 0.15 \) for youth) or a perfect substitute (\( \sigma = -0.5 \) for adults and \( \sigma = -0.15 \) for youth) for an average day of smoking. Rows 8 and 11 show that if e-cigarettes are stronger substitutes and \( \alpha = 0.05 \), it is optimal to subsidize e-cigarettes. For example, in column 1 of row 8, the optimal policy is a $2.65/ml e-liquid subsidy. These results would be consistent with arguments to encourage e-cigarettes as a harm-reduction approach for existing smokers, notwithstanding the harms from vaping.

Row 12 assumes no substitution (\( \sigma_\theta = 0 \)). Optimal policy then considers the e-cigarette market in isolation. While all of our other analyses hold cigarette taxes at their current level \( \bar{\tau}_c \), row 13 allows the social planner to set the optimal cigarette tax \( \tau^* = \tau^{*c} \) from equation (14). Since we allow for heterogeneous consumer types (youth and adults), the substitution distortion in equation (14) is nonzero even at the optimal cigarette tax. However, because our shift-share estimates of \( \sigma_\theta \) are close to zero and youth are a small share of the population, rows 12 and 13 are very similar to each other and to the primary estimates in row 1.

Rows 14 and 15 consider the youth and adult markets in isolation. Since the mean \( \rho \approx 1.47 \), the average marginal distortion (and thus the optimal tax, if the substitution distortion is negligible) is almost 50 percent larger for youth as it is for adults. At \( \alpha = 0.37 \), the per-youth gains from a youth-specific ban are 3–4 times larger than the per-adult gains from an adult-specific ban. This underscores there are plausible parameters under which the current policy norm of a youth sales ban plus a tax on the remaining sales to adults would be the constrained optimum if leakage or enforcement issues make it easier to impose type-specific bans than type-specific taxes.

Rows 16 and 17 (in panel B of Table 4 only) present the welfare effects of a ban under alternative assumptions for the demand elasticity \( \eta \). More inelastic demand implies larger perceived consumer surplus loss.

VII. Conclusion

Electronic cigarettes are one of the most controversial new products of the past decade, due to uncertainty about their health effects and whether they are primarily a quit aid or a gateway drug for combustible cigarettes. We lay out a simple behavioral optimal policy framework that delivers formulas for the optimal e-cigarette tax and welfare effects of a ban as functions of several key statistics. We estimate these statistics using Nielsen RMS scanner data, sample surveys, and a new survey of e-cigarette experts. We find that e-cigarette demand is price elastic, vaping is neither a significant complement nor substitute for smoking in the demographic shift-share strategy, and experts now believe that vaping is more harmful than prior assessments had suggested.

In our model, the optimal e-cigarette tax to address plausible amounts of present focus is probably higher than the average taxes in 2018. However, the Monte

\[ ^{26} \text{The optimal cigarette tax is } \$10.32 \text{ if } \alpha = 0.05 \text{ and is almost identical if } \alpha = 0.37, \text{ since we estimate such limited substitution.} \]
Carlo simulations highlight substantial uncertainty, and subsidies could be optimal if vaping is safer than our experts believe and is also a strong substitute for smoking, or if information provision cannot address consumers’ misperceptions of the health harms from vaping. Since most of the remaining policy uncertainty in our model is driven by the uninternalized externalities and internalities from vaping, more research on those parameters would be very valuable.

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