Online Supplement

A Supplementary Figures

Figure S1: ERAP Effect on Non-Suits

Note: This figure shows the effect of Memphis/Shelby County’s ERAP on non-suits (explicit withdrawals from the court system) using the primary design (Equation 95).
Figure S2: Correlation between Misperceptions and Altruism among Tenants

(a) Own landlord altruism

(b) Average landlord altruism

(c) Own landlord bargaining

(d) Average landlord bargaining

Note: This figure shows binned scatterplots of tenant prior beliefs (horizontal axis) and tenant behavior toward their own landlord in the Dictator Game (vertical axis). Panels A and B show prior beliefs about own and average altruism. Panels C and D show prior beliefs about own and average bargaining behavior. The red vertical line indicates the truth about the average.
Figure S3: Information is More Effective among Tenants with Strong Relationships

(a) Altruism treatment

(b) Bargaining treatment

Note: Panels A and B present versions of Figure 4C and D, limiting only to tenants with high degrees of altruism toward their own landlords. In particular, we keep the tenants who prefer \((x \text{ self}, x \text{ landlord})\) to \((2x \text{ self}, 0 \text{ landlord})\).
Figure S4: Beliefs about Eviction: Memphis Sample

(a) Beliefs about Percent of Tenants who Repay Money Judgments

(b) Beliefs about Number of Cases Processed in Eviction Court

Note: Panels A and B present beliefs about the eviction process, elicited among the Memphis sample. The vertical lines represent means. The true values are 6 (Panel A) and 54 (Panel B).
Figure S5: Treatment Effect of Bargaining on WTP for Information about Altruism

Note: This figure shows intent-to-treat effects of the bargaining information treatment among tenants on willingness to pay for information about the share of landlords who had the highest possible indifference point in the DG, in the landlord sample. The max WTP that could be consistently reported was $8.
This figure shows intent-to-treat effects of the bargaining and altruism information treatments among tenants on offered repayment rates in the payment plan. The repayment shares are 0 if they do not want a payment plan but were offered the chance to form one.
Figure S7: Treatment Effect of Information on Hypothetical WTP to Move

(a) Altruism treatment

(b) Bargaining treatment

This figure shows intent-to-treat effects of the altruism and bargaining information treatments on tenants' willingness to accept $1000 versus move. This question was asked of all tenants.